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ABSTRACT 
When public health interventions are incorporated into a comprehensive seaport 
security strategy, they can effectively prevent and reduce morbidity and mortality, 
resulting from natural or man-made disasters.  The challenge is to build collaborative 
capacities through new and renewed seaport surveillance activities among government 
agencies and private companies to strengthen the role of public health to detect, intercept, 
and mitigate the potential effects of the intentional or unintentional introduction of 
diseases.  Currently, effective collaborative processes between public health agencies and 
other local, state and federal partners in seaport security are weak and primarily the result 
of informal activities.  Although seaport security receives considerable policy attention in 
other areas of risk management, such as radiological detection, public health investments 
are relatively neglected.  Effective, sustainable approaches to building interagency 
collaboration could prove to be an indispensable homeland security initiative to prepare 
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A. SAVANNAH PORT INCIDENT; OCTOBER 18, 2005 
The Chatham County Health Department, Coastal Health District (CHD), 
received a message from an unidentified worker at the Port of Savannah stating that a 
ship with dead birds on board had arrived from China. The caller stated that U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) had instructed the crew to “clean up the mess,” but 
had not taken any further actions. Internal local and state public health notifications were 
initiated and an attempt was made to identify the caller by contacting the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Atlanta Quarantine Station (ATL QS) to ascertain 
if their office knew about this incident.  The Medical Officer stated he was not aware of 
the incident, but he told CHD who to contact at the Savannah Port CBP office to facilitate 
further investigation.  
The CBP office was contacted and the identity of the initial caller was determined 
to be a CBP officer, who verified the report that a cargo vessel had arrived from China 
with dead birds on board. The CBP officer confirmed that the crew had thrown several 
carcasses onto the dock and that CBP had instructed the crew to collect the birds and 
return them to the vessel.  Concerned about avian influenza, the CBP officer expressed 
her frustration with the difficulty of contacting public health during the lunch hour.  She 
had tried several phone numbers, but no one answered. She left a voicemail message for a 
public health staff member who was out of the office for the day. She finally reached a 
clerk who recorded an incomplete message.  The officer requested public health guidance 
for further precautionary interventions.  Local and state public health, in consultation 
with the ATL QS, advised CBP to verify the ship’s itinerary and the health status of all 
crew and passengers.  Subsequently, Chatham County Environmental Health and Georgia 
Department of Agriculture officials responded to the scene. 
The vessel master stated the ship had sailed through a hurricane off the Baja coast 
of California and hundreds of birds had taken refuge on the ship.  After the storm, most 
of the birds flew away, but many of the smaller birds died and were found on the deck 
between the containers and in other protected areas of the vessel.  This account was 
2 
verified.  There were no sick crew members or passengers on board.  This information 
was communicated to state public health and ATL QS officers who determined the 
incident to be low risk for transmitting zoonotic disease and the birds were incinerated 
without further testing or intervention. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
While this incident was not a public health emergency, it did expose major gaps 
in interagency communication, information sharing and collaboration for a unified 
response to a biological threat occurring at the Georgia seaports.  In theory, disease 
control is the responsibility of the locale in which the disease occurs.  However with 
globalization, the whole world may be at risk when there is a failure to effectively detect, 
control and respond to a disease outbreak at the local level.  The probability of containing 
a disease of public health significance depends on how quickly the disease is detected and 
public health measures are implemented to limit the spread.1  The speed of this process is 
directly dependent on multi-agency collaboration, communication and cooperation in 
detecting and responding to a microbial threat.  This issue is of prime importance to 
homeland security because of the social and economic ramifications of a disease outbreak 
with high morbidity and mortality that could have been prevented or mitigated through 
rapid detection and response. The threat of pandemic influenza imparts urgency to this 
task.   
This incident provided an impetus to engage in a collaborative process to 
strengthen relationships between the CHD/Georgia Division of Public Health (GDPH), 
CBP, United States Coast Guard and the CDC ATL QS.  This collaboration would 
hopefully lead to a more effective process for detecting and responding to a microbial 
threat at the Georgia Ports of Savannah and Brunswick. To ameliorate the lack of 
interagency communication, a series of meetings were scheduled to develop a process to 
enhance sharing of information, establish open communication channels, clarify agency 
                                                 
1World Health Organization (WHO), Pandemic Influenza Draft Protocol for Rapid Response and 
Containment (Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, May 30, 2006), 
www.who.int/csr/disease/avaian_influenza/guidelines/protocolfinal30_05_06a.pdf. [accessed February 4, 
2007]. 
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roles and responsibilities, strengthen relationships and develop a unified response to a 
biosecurity threat originating or occurring at the seaport. 
Three months after this incident, the Institute of Medicine published a report 
entitled “Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry” that verified the issues experienced in the 
Savannah incident were not unique, but rather reflected a national deficiency in the 
collaborative capacity of local, state and federal agencies with overlapping jurisdictions 
and responsibilities to protect the public from the threat of infectious diseases that 
originate abroad.2  The report recognized the criticality of multi-agency sharing of 
information, communication and cooperation in disease detection and response at the 
Nation’s ports of entry to support the core mission of the CDC Quarantine Stations.  This 
core mission is to mitigate the risks to U.S. residents posed by infectious diseases of 
public health significance originating abroad.3 
Recommendation #2 of the report directs Quarantine Station staff to work with 
federal, state and local stakeholders to delineate each partner’s role, authority and channel 
of communication to minimize the risk of microbial threats of public health significance 
entering the United States.4  Interagency communication, information sharing and 
collaborative planning for a unified response provide a framework for reducing the 
morbidity and mortality resulting from such an event.  A coordinated effort by all 
responding agencies is necessary to contain the disease and reduce or prevent 
unnecessary exposure and transmission of the illness to the public at large.  
As William Pelfrey points out, collaboration and information sharing are the two 
predicate elements that enable multiple agencies and jurisdictions to effectively prevent 
incidents or mitigate their impact to the community.5  Hurricane Katrina response offers a 
vivid example of the result of poor governmental interagency collaborative planning, lack 
                                                 
2 Laura Sivitz, Kathleen Stratton, and Georges Benjamin, Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry 
Protecting the Public's Health (Washington D.C.: Institute of Medicine of the National Academies Press, 
2006), 10.  [accessed February 4, 2007]. 
3  Ibid., 4. [accessed February 4, 2007].  
4  Ibid., 10. [accessed February 4, 2007].   
5  William V. Pelfrey, "The Cycle of Preparedness:  Establishing a Framework to Prepare for Terrorist 
Threats," Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 2, no.1, Article 5 (2005): 11.  
www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol2/iss1/5/.  [accessed February 4, 2007].   
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of cooperation and failed communications.6  This thesis will examine the case of 
interagency collaborative capacity building in the development of an alert and 
notification protocol for a biosecurity threat at the Georgia seaports using the diagnostic 
approach and framework described by Thomas et al (2006).7 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Who are the key stakeholders from the public health perspective in 
protecting the U.S. public from the intentional or unintentional 
introduction of microbial threats that originate abroad?   
2. What is the role of local public health in supporting the operations of the 
CDC Quarantine Stations? 
3. How can local, state and federal agencies with jurisdictional authority and 
responsibility collaboratively develop an infectious disease evaluation and 
response protocol to reduce the risk of an infectious disease of public 
health significance from entering the United States? 
4. How can public-private partnerships support this process? 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Current Perspective 
Vulnerabilities in seaport security represent a major homeland security issue that 
is of vital importance to the economic stability of the United States.8   In the aftermath of 
September 11, the vulnerabilities inherent in seaport security were recognized, but most 
funding was directed towards strengthening passenger security in the airline industry.9  
New focus has been directed towards the challenges of securing our nation’s seaports 
with the release of the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its eight supporting 
plans that address different aspects of the maritime threat and includes the International 
                                                 
6  Douglas Brinkley, The Great Deluge, Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans, and the Mississippi Gulf 
Coast (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2006), 38.  [accessed February 4, 2007].   
7  Gail F. Thomas, Susan P. Hocevar, and Erik Jansen, A Diagnostic Approach to Building 
Collaborative Capacity in an Interagency Context (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School), 2006, 
http://acquisitionresearch.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=102&ltemid=41.   [accessed 
February 4, 2007].   
8  National Strategy for Maritime Security (Washington D.C.: The White House, September 2005).  
www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/maritime-security.html. [accessed February 4, 2007]. 
9  Lara L. Sowinski, "A Turning Tide for U.S. Seaports," World Trade, 17, no. 12. (December 2004): 
30.  www.worldtrademag.com/CDA/Articles/Ports/653d1e36d9af7010VgnVCM100000f932a8c0. 
[accessed February 4, 2007].   
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Outreach and Coordination Strategy, the National Strategy for Maritime Security, and the 
National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness.10    
The International Outreach and Coordination Strategy identified human 
smuggling networks and bioterrorism attacks as threats to the maritime domain.11   The 
strategy further states that a bioterrorism attack would most likely be perpetrated by a 
small, sophisticated group and be exceedingly difficult to detect.12  The Central 
Intelligence Agency analysis agrees that a bioterrorism attack by a small, sophisticated 
group is a high probability event.13  An attack perpetrated by international crewmen 
during a rapid turnover port visit is a viable biosecurity threat.14  The National Plan to 
Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, the National Strategy for Maritime Security and 
the International Outreach and Coordination Strategy consider undocumented 
immigration as a security threat, but fail to recognize the risk of the intentional or un-
intentional introduction of a disease of public health significance into the United States.15   
The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 establishes a framework for 
public-private collaboration in port security.16  This legislation mandates layered security 
and increased awareness of potential threats throughout the maritime domain.  The goal is 
to improve communication, coordinate unity of effort and reduce the threat of an incident 
that entails a threat to U.S. security.  An intentional or unintentional disease outbreak of 
public health significance is not mentioned in the Maritime Transportation Security Act, 
but definitely represents a potential biothreat to the maritime domain.   
                                                 
10  National Strategy for Maritime Security, 2.  
11  International Outreach and Coordination Strategy for the National Strategy for Maritime Security 
(Washington D.C.: State Department, November 2005).  
www.state.gov/documents/organization/64251.pdf.  [accessed February 4, 2007]. 
12  Ibid. 
13  Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. National Intelligence Council, Central Intelligence Agency, December 2004), 20.  
http://www.foia.cia.gov/2020/2020.pdf.  [accessed February 4, 2007].   
14  Malcolm Dando, Bioterrorism: What is the Real Threat? (West Yorks, UK: Department of Peace 
Studies, University of Bradford, March 2005). 
www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/ST_Reports/ST_Report_No_3.pdf.  [accessed February 4, 2007].   
15  National Strategy for Maritime Security; International Outreach and Coordination Strategy,  
National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness  (Washington D.C.: White House, October  2005). 
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSPD_MDAPlan.pdf.  [accessed February 4, 2007].    
16 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-295, November 2002.  
http://www.uscg.mil/HQ/G-M/MP/pdf/MTSA_S_Englebert.pdf .  [accessed February 4, 2007]. 
6 
The National Strategy for Maritime Security recognizes the fact that the first line 
of response to a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) event is local responders, 
including medical care providers, and advocates “extensive contingency plans for 
response, assessment and recovery.”17  The importance of collaborative teamwork to 
protect people, minimize damage and expedite recovery is stated in the conclusion to this 
document; however, while these actions represent the expertise and role of public health 
capacity to respond to a WMD event the connection is notably omitted from the 
document.18 
Most alarming is that none of these above-mentioned documents recognize the 
role of federal, state or local public health agencies in control and response to such an 
event.   Furthermore, the role of public health in response to a biosecurity threat 
involving the seaports is not well-described in the literature and represents a gap in 
current knowledge. 
In contrast, the National Strategy for Homeland Security recognizes bioterrorism 
as a viable threat, identifies the role of federal, state and local public health agencies, and 
promulgates the review of quarantine authorities as a major initiative.19  The National 
Strategy was published in the aftermath of the anthrax attacks (2001) and the Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak (2003), which brought these issues to the 
forefront.  Pandemic influenza further serves as a reminder that emerging infectious 
diseases are a viable biosecurity threat and a critical part of the plan and therefore, must 
be included as a homeland security issue.20  
The U.S. Public Health Service, of which the CDC Division of Global Migration 
and Quarantine is a part, has statutory and regulatory responsibility to prevent the 
introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable disease from foreign countries 
                                                 
17  National Strategy for Maritime Security, 14. 
18  Ibid., 25. 
19  National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington D.C.: White House, July 2002), 49. 
www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/.  [accessed February 4, 2007].   
20  Meredith Cohn, "Border Security Tightened as Precaution to a Pandemic," Baltimore Sun, January 
8, 2006.  http://www.montereyherald.com/mld/montereyherald/living/health/13578805/13578805.htm.  
[accessed January 10, 2006]. 
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into the United States.21  The quarantine program was very strong in the early 1900s and 
virtually all travelers arriving at a U.S. seaport were met and screened for communicable 
diseases by a Marine Hospital Service officer.  When responsibility for the quarantine 
program was transferred to the CDC in 1967, quarantine stations were located at every 
port, international airport and major border crossing in the United States.  With the 
eradication of smallpox in the 1970s, the CDC reduced the size of the quarantine program 
and changed its focus from routine inspections to program management and problem 
intervention.22  By the year 2004, the number of quarantine stations was reduced to eight 
and were charged with serving the entire nation. The SARS outbreak in 2003, 
underscored the need for a rapid response to emerging infectious disease threats from 
foreign sources. During this outbreak, CDC encountered difficulties in tracking persons 
who may have been exposed to an ill international traveler. New federal regulations are 
pending that would update 42 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 70 and 71 to 
require airlines and shipping industries to keep electronic copies of passenger manifests 
for sixty days with required release to health officials investigating possible exposure to 
diseases of public health significance.  The CDC recently implemented a plan to expand 
the number of quarantine stations. Currently, there are eighteen stations nationwide with 
plans to expand the number to twenty five to cover the nation’s 474 major ports of 
entry.23   
The Quarantine Station serving the Georgia Ports Authority is located in Atlanta, 
Georgia and is responsible for international arrivals in Georgia, North Carolina, 
Arkansas, South Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana.24  Federal 
isolation and quarantine is authorized for nine communicable diseases: cholera, 
diphtheria, tuberculosis, plague, suspected smallpox, yellow fever, viral hemorrhagic 
                                                 
21  Public Health Screening at U.S. Ports of Entry: A Guide for Federal Inspectors (U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, March 2000), 2.  
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dq/pdf/hguide.pdf.  [accessed February 4, 2007]. 
22 History of Quarantine (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), 
http://ww.cdc.gov/ncidod/dq/history.htm.  [accessed February 4, 2007]. 
23  Control of Communicable Disease Proposed 42 CFR Parts 70 and 71 (Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, Division of Global Migration and Quarantine).  www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dq/nprm/.  [accessed 
February 4, 2007].  
24  Quarantine Stations (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). 
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dq/quarantine_stations.htm.  [accessed February 4, 2007].   
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fevers, SARS, and novel influenza.25  Obviously, international travelers do not arrive 
with an attached diagnostic label, making screening procedures vital to detection and 
response.26  Also obvious, CDC quarantine officers are not immediately available to 
provide medical evaluation for travelers with signs and symptoms of illness, making 
reporting procedures vital for appropriate intervention.27  
Federal and state laws overlap in jurisdiction and authority once an international 
carrier arrives in the United States, leading to some confusion over the role of each 
agency.28  Preservation of the public health is the responsibility of state and local 
agencies, but response to an infectious disease event requires communication and 
collaboration among local, state and federal entities with jurisdictional responsibility for 
the containment.29  Primary quarantine authority is a function of state health officials, but 
the federal government exercises authority over interstate and foreign quarantine.30  
Challenges evident in the quarantine process led to the Department of Health and Human 
Services proposing to update the Code of Federal Regulations 42 CFR Parts 70 and 71 to 
strengthen the capacity to enforce regulations.31   
Gaps, barriers and shortfalls are evident in the current legislative and practice 
arena for isolation and quarantine, screening procedures, and reporting process for 
communicable diseases at the nation’s seaports.32  Understanding these gaps, barriers and 
shortfalls are the first step in the collaborative development of interagency best practices 
to effectively address biosecurity threats at the Georgia Ports.  
                                                 
25  Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention).  
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dq/quarantine.htm#2.  [accessed February 4, 2007]. 
26  Public Health Screening at U.S. Ports of Entry, 3. 
27  Ibid, 3. 
28  Angie Welborn, Federal and State Quarantine and Isolation Authority (Washington D.C.:  
Congressional Research Service, January 18, 2005), 6.  www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL31333.pdf.  [accessed 
February 4, 2007]. 
29 Sivitz, Stratton and Benjamin, Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry Protecting the Public’s Health, 
4. 
30 Welborn, Federal and State Quarantine and Isolation Authority, 2. 
31  Control of Communicable Disease Proposed 42 CFR Parts 70 and 71.   
32  Sivitz, Stratton and Benjamin, Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry Protecting the Public's Health, 
14.  
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2. Interagency Collaboration in Homeland Security  
Many of the federal guidance and strategy documents related to homeland 
security, recognize that no single governmental agency has the capacity, skills or 
resources to respond to every threat and propose that interagency collaboration is a 
critical component of preparedness to achieve optimal information sharing, 
communication and cooperation. The Introduction of the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security states that a comprehensive strategy based on the principles of cooperation and 
partnership will enhance our protection and reduce our vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks.  
The strategy calls for integrated information sharing and improved communication 
systems across governmental agencies, within levels of government and with the private 
sector to optimize security for a better, stronger and safer America.33  Pelfrey noted that 
information sharing can occur with greater ease, frequency, reliability, and validity, if 
collaboration has been practiced.34   However, the response to Hurricane Katrina 
provides evidence of the lack of progress since September 11, 2001, in governmental 
interagency collaborative planning, cooperation and communication in development of a 
seamless response to a catastrophic event.35   
The criticality of a coordinated, unified response is well-recognized and the 
directive to develop collaborative capacity has been given, but little guidance has been 
offered in the successful establishment of collaborative systems.36 Collaborative capacity 
is defined as the ability of organizations to enter into, develop and sustain inter-
organizational systems in pursuit of collective outcomes.37  The model described by 
Thomas et al is a readiness assessment that can be used by organizations to define and 
                                                 
33  National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2.  
34  Pelfrey, "The Cycle of Preparedness," 9.  
35  Scott E. Robinson, Britt Berrett, and Kelley Stone, "The Development of Collaboration of 
Response to Hurricane Katrina in the Dallas Area," Public Works Management & Policy 10, no. 4 (April 
2006):  315.  http://pwm.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/10/4/315.  [accessed February 5, 2007].  
36  Susan Hocevar, Eric Jansen, and Gail Thomas, Building Collaborative Capacity for Homeland 
Security (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), 1. [accessed February 5, 2007]. 
37  Thomas, Hocevar, and Jansen, "A Diagnostic Approach to Building Collaborative Capacity in an 
Interagency Context," 2.  
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improve their collaborative capacity.38  The model describes enablers and barriers to 
interagency collaboration and provides a framework for case study analysis using 
organizational design components that include purpose and strategy, structure, lateral 
mechanisms, incentives and people.39 
 
                                                 
38  Thomas, Hocevar, and Jansen, "A Diagnostic Approach to Building Collaborative Capacity in an 
Interagency Context,"3.  
39  Ibid., 6. 
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II. THE COLLABORATIVE PLANNING PROCESS 
A. MODEL OF COLLABORATIVE CAPACITY 
In response to the clearly defined need for teamwork, information sharing and 
collaboration in the Department of Homeland Security preparedness initiatives, Thomas 
and others embarked upon research to describe the successful interagency collaborative 
process.  The goal of their research was to build a foundation of relevant knowledge 
concerning inter-organizational collaboration that would assist local, state and federal 
officials in the management of activities related to homeland security.40  Part of their 
research process included the design of an action-based workshop to gather data from 
thirty senior homeland security professionals enrolled in the Masters in Homeland 
Security course at the Naval Postgraduate School in 2004, thus providing real insights 
into the challenges faced by governmental agencies in pursuit of improved collaborative 
capacity for a seamless response.41  The results from this workshop were used by the 
researchers to describe factors that explain success (enablers) and barriers that deter 
effective collaboration.   
Information sharing, cooperation, open communication and collaboration are 
current homeland security buzzwords, yet many collaborative planning efforts achieve 
less than optimal results or even fail in the attempt.  Eugene Bardach describes 
collaboration as an unnatural process committed by non-consenting adults.42  Barriers to 
successful collaboration include mission diversity, conflicting goals and incentives, 
distrust among agencies, lack of administrative support and the lack of coordination 
systems and structures to support the efforts.43  Thomas and others used a “force field” 
analysis model developed by Lewin to provide a framework for examining the enablers 
                                                 
40  Thomas, Hocevar, and Jansen, "Building Collaborative Capacity for Homeland Security," 1.  
41  Ibid. 
42  Eugene Bardach, Getting Agencies to Work Together: The Practice and Theory of Managerial 
Craftsmanship  (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 263.  
43 Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership, (Washington D.C.: US Government 
Accountability Office, Homeland Security, GAO-03-260, December 2002).  
www.gao.gov/htext/d03260.html.  [accessed February 5, 2007].  
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and barriers to successful collaboration.44  This model introduces the concepts of “driving 
forces” and “restraining forces” to explain the dynamics of change.  To increase 
collaborative capacity, an organization must strengthen its “driving forces,” or enablers, 
to overcome “restraining forces,” or barriers, to the process.45   
The Collaborative Capacity Model uses five components of organizational design 
to identify the enablers or “driving force” factors and barriers or “restraining forces” that 
inhibit collaborative capacity.  
1. The structural component refers to having the right people at the 
collaborative table; people who have the power and authority to engage in 
the process with no impeding rules or policies of the participating 
agencies. 
2.   The people component focuses on the innate characteristics of the 
participants to appreciate others’ perspectives, and build trust, 
commitment and motivation.  
3.  Lateral mechanisms are described as effective communication and 
information sharing used to build a social network.  Barriers to building 
this social network are distrust of others as evidenced by inadequate 
communication and information sharing and lack of familiarity with the 
mission, goals and objectives of the other participating agencies.  
4. The purpose and strategy component refers to having a reason to 
embark upon the collaborative process by having a commonly perceived 
threat or goal that meets the interests of each participating agency.  
5.  The incentives component refers to the payoff or benefit that each 
agency receives by participating in the collaborative process.46 
This model will be used to analyze the successful collaborative partnership at the 
Georgia seaports to determine how well it describes the actual process in an attempt to 
validate or dispute the constructs of the model.  The model will be used to describe and 
classify the factors that served as enablers or barriers to the collaborative process and the 
development of the Shipping Agent Survey, a vendor-generated syndromic surveillance  
 
 
                                                 
44 Thomas, Hocevar, and Jansen, "A Diagnostic Approach to Building Collaborative Capacity in an 
Interagency Context,” 5.  
45 Ibid.  
46  Thomas, Hocevar, and Jansen, "A Diagnostic Approach to Building Collaborative Capacity in an 
Interagency Context,” 6. 
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system (FirstWatch®, Stout Solutions, Salinas, CA) for the Port of Savannah and the 
Infectious Disease Evaluation and Response Plan at the Georgia Ports, which were the 
products of this successful initiative.  
B. STRUCTURAL COMPONENT 
A successful structural component of the Collaborative Capacity Model is 
characterized by team members with formal power and authority engaged in the 
collaborative planning process.47  The need to identify the appropriate internal and 
external stakeholders in protecting the U.S. public from an intentional or unintentional 
introduction of microbial threats that may be introduced from abroad was accomplished 
on November 2, 2005, when CHD and CBP staff met to complete an after action report 
regarding the Savannah Port incident.  It was agreed that communication channels and 
interagency relationships needed clarification and improvement.  The U.S. Coast Guard 
(USCG), ATL QS and GDPH staff were identified as key stakeholders in the planning 
process in preventing the introduction of a biothreat through the port but were not 
present.  
At a follow-up meeting held on November 9, with these stakeholders present, it 
was agreed that a collaborative response protocol geared to strengthening interagency 
relationships, clarifying communication channels and leading to a more unified response 
was critical.  The participants held administrative positions with subject matter expertise 
and authority to make administrative decisions for their agency and formed the core work 
group in the collaborative planning process.  
Identification and inclusion of other stakeholders emerged as the collaborative 
planning process progressed over the next year.  Emergency Medical Services (EMS), 
Emergency Management Agency, hospital safety and infection control, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, law enforcement, Savannah Maritime Association and port 
industry staff were invited to participate in the planning process (see Figure 1).  Regional 
interest developed and the group expanded to include stakeholders from the Ports of 
Charleston and Mobile (See Appendix 2 for a list of all participating agencies). 
                                                 
47 Thomas, Hocevar, and Jansen, "A Diagnostic Approach to Building Collaborative Capacity in an 
Interagency Context,” 7.  
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Port industry and vessel services personnel including shipping agents, stevedores 
and Port Authority staff were identified as having a vital role in the early detection of a 
biothreat among international travelers and having responsibility for rapid notification to 
the appropriate government agency.  Vessel masters originate from various regions 
throughout the world and visit numerous ports during their voyage, but the sheer numbers 
preclude any meaningful relationship, training or partnership opportunities.  Vessel 
ownership may be foreign and depend upon contractual services with local shipping 
agents.  The shipping agents are the most likely point of contact for ill crew members 
requiring healthcare services because they provide vessel services, represent a local entity 
and possess knowledge of the health status of international crewmen on the vessel.  The 
shipping agent responsible for cargo vessel services would typically receive notification 
from the master before arrival of the vessel in the event of a sick crewman or a disease 
outbreak.  This relationship clearly places shipping agents in a unique position as a 
valuable partner in disease surveillance and control efforts over other port industry 
entities.  Therefore, collaborative public-private partnerships with port industry 
organizations would enhance the likelihood of prompt detection and rapid notification, 
and promote an effective response to a biological threat at the Georgia Ports of Savannah 
and Brunswick.  
In summary, enablers to the establishment of a viable structure for the interagency 
collaborative group included prompt identification of the essential, primary stakeholders 
including shipping industry, healthcare entities, law enforcement, state and local public 
health, ATL QS, CBP and USCG. The importance of improving the collective response 
to an infectious disease threat prompted each agency to send a staff member with the 
authority and expertise to make definitive decisions regarding response procedures, thus 
providing the right people at the collaborative table.  The resultant interactions and 
communications gradually led to the identification and inclusion of the expanded group 
of stakeholders in the collaborative planning process.    
Conversely, the expanded group of stakeholders actually became a barrier to 




dialogue.  To address the challenge, the expanded work group agreed that each core 
agency should appoint a subject matter expert to work in a small group to refine the final 
products that were under development.  
Barriers to the structure of the collaborative process also included the difficulties 
inherent in the engagement of the shipping agents in a public-private partnership to 
improve the disease reporting process.  While the private sector is focused on protecting 
economic interests in terms of the provision of services, commodities and jobs, the 
government entities are focused on protecting and promoting public welfare.  This 
diametrically opposed focus suggests that engagement with the private sector requires 
sensitivity to the private sector economic considerations when initiating and developing 
public-private collaborations.  Private partners are unlikely to respond positively if 
economic barriers are created as a result of their cooperative efforts.  Industry benefits of 
collaboration to detect, prevent, respond and mitigate infectious disease events were 
clearly articulated in making the case to develop protocols for enhanced information 
sharing and implemented disease control measures that minimize the impact on the 
workforce.    
Building alliances with port industry through the Savannah Maritime Association 
fostered a unified, collaborative initiative to improve communication and information 
sharing.  It also provided a venue to engage the members in planning and policy 
development.  The Savannah Maritime Association is a member of the Area Maritime 
Security Committee with a membership that encompasses port industries and local, state 
and federal governmental agencies with jurisdictional responsibility for the Georgia 
ports.  The association’s participation in the process increased cooperation and improved 
outcomes.  Institutionalization of policies and maintenance of long-term relationships 
was a benefit of public health’s membership in the Savannah Maritime Association.   
Meetings provided a venue to increase biological threat awareness, raise concerns, share 
information, discuss options and collaboratively address gaps and barriers in the planning 
process.   
The structural component that provided inputs, or resources, into the collaborative 
planning process is illustrated in Figure 1.  This figure will be utilized throughout this 
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discussion to illustrate and clarify the progression from inputs into the collaborative 
process through the production of outputs that lead to the desired outcomes of healthy 
people and a healthy community. 
   












































Figure 1.   Biological Threat Detection and Control: Inputs, Determining the Structural 
Component  
 
C. LATERAL MECHANISMS 
The Collaborative Capacity Model describes lateral mechanisms as the social 
capital and communication that develops from human interaction.  Effective 
communication results from the increased familiarity and interpersonal network 
formation that develop as people spend time together in repeated interactive encounters.  
Barriers to the “lateral mechanism” are described as a lack of familiarity with other 
organizations and inadequate information sharing and communication.48  
                                                 
48  Thomas, Hocevar, and Jansen, "A Diagnostic Approach to Building Collaborative Capacity in an 
Interagency Context,” 7. 
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This lack of familiarity was noted as a barrier to the planning process at the 
November 9, 2005, meeting when the core stakeholders came to a consensus that they 
were unfamiliar with the mission of the other agencies missions, jurisdictions and daily 
operating procedures.  During that meeting, each agency gave a general overview to 
clarify organizational mandates and to ensure understanding of how agencies could work 
collaboratively to improve a collective response.  The understanding gleaned from that 
meeting was deemed so valuable to the core work group that a decision was made to 
share the information at a large educational meeting for local public health and health 
care community, CBP and USCG staff held in January 2006.  The following is an 
overview of the role of each core agency provided by that organization in disease 
detection, notification, and implementation of prevention and control measures.  
1. Atlanta Quarantine Station (ATL QS) 
The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services has statutory 
responsibility for preventing the introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable 
diseases in the United States. Under its delegated authority, the CDC Division of Global 
Migration and Quarantine works to fulfill this responsibility through a variety of 
activities, which include the operation of Quarantine Stations at ports of entry, 
establishment of standards for medical examination of persons destined to permanently 
reside in the United States, and administration of interstate and foreign quarantine 
regulations that govern the international and interstate movement of persons, animals, 
and cargo. Foreign students, visitors and temporary workers are not included under the 
medical examination standards for entry into the United States.  The legal foundation for 
these activities is found in Titles 8 and 42 of the U.S. CFR and relevant supporting 
regulations.49  The ATL QS has operational jurisdiction with authority to detain, 
medically examine or conditionally release individuals believed to be carrying a 
communicable disease of public health significance.50  The ATL QS has four staff 
members and bears primary responsibility in identifying and responding to human health 
risks arriving at all ports of entry in Georgia, Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
                                                 
49 42 CFR Parts 70 and 71.  http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dq/lawsand.htm. [accessed February 5, 2007]. 
50 Ibid.  
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North Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee.   Therefore, the obligation to report ill 
passengers or crew resides with vessel masters. Compliance with reporting regulations is 
often sporadic.51  Vessel masters are mainly concerned with keeping the vessel engaged 
in commerce and avoiding any delays at port.  For this reason, vessel masters may not 
comply with mandatory disease reporting procedures.   
Additionally, there is a great deal of variation in disease reporting compliance 
between ports.  This is often a reflection of how recently the port was visited by the 
Quarantine Officer and education provided on the reporting requirements.  Educating all 
stakeholders is difficult because of the magnitude of numbers of international vessels and 
shipping agents.  The Quarantine Officers often rely on local/state public health response 
to incidents because the Quarantine Station is generally located at a distance from the 
port.  In addition, CDC Quarantine Stations develop Memorandums of Understanding 
signed with local hospitals to receive and treat international travelers with diseases 
subject to a quarantine order.52 
2. Coastal Health District, Georgia Division of Public Health   
The GDPH is an agency of the Georgia Department of Human Resources and is 
the lead agency entrusted by the people of the State of Georgia with the ultimate 
responsibility for the health of communities and the entire population.  The vision of the 
GDPH is a Georgia with healthy people, families, and communities, where all sectors 
unite by pooling their assets and strengths to promote health for all. Decisions are made 
in harmony with economic and environmental concerns.53  The GDPH provides 
leadership to each of the 18 health districts in Georgia to promote, protect and improve 
the health and safety of the people. 
The CHD is entrusted by the State of Georgia with the responsibility for the 
health of the community, which consists of Bryan, Camden, Chatham, Effingham, Glynn, 
                                                 
51 David Kim (Medical Officer, CDC Atlanta Quarantine Station), "Overview of Quarantine Station 
Medical Operations,” Presentation at the Port of Savannah, January 25, 2006. 
52  Terrence Daley (Chief Quarantine Officer, CDC Atlanta Quarantine Station), “Overview of 
Quarantine Station Operations,” Presentation at the Port of Savannah, January 25, 2006.  
53  Georgia Division of Public Health, “Mission and Vision,”  
http://health.state.ga.us/visionmission.asp.  [accessed February 5, 2007]. 
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Liberty, Long and McIntosh Counties.54  The district and county public health staff work 
under the direction of the District Health Director who serves as the Chairman of the 
Board of Health in every county served.  The mission of the CHD is to ensure conditions 
in which people can be healthy and to provide leadership in the prevention of disease and 
injury.  The CHD bears primary responsibility for the management and monitoring of 
individuals with a disease of public health significance once crew members disembark 
from an international vessel at Georgia seaports and for the protection of the community 
against such a threat. 
3. U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Marine Safety Unit of Savannah 
The USCG Marine Safety Unit of Savannah has jurisdiction from the Port of 
Savannah in Chatham County to the southern border of Naval Kings Bay Submarine 
Base in Camden County.  The USCG is responsible for all port security measures, which 
include activities of targeted boarding teams, pollution and all hazards response, vessel 
and crew inspections, investigation of maritime casualties, revocation of mariners’ 
documents, intelligence team investigations, contingency planning, enforcement of vessel 
quarantine orders, and general safety and security of the Georgia seaports.  Every vessel 
in a U.S. seaport is subject to control by the federal government in so far as this control is 
directed toward verifying that the vessel is in compliance with international maritime 
conventions and U.S. law.  The 33 CFR § 6.04-8 gives the Captain of the Port the 
authority to "control the movement of any vessel within the territorial waters of the 
United States under his jurisdiction, whenever it appears to him that such action is 
necessary in order to secure such vessel from damage or injury, or to prevent damage or 
injury to any vessel or waterfront facility or waters of the United States".55  The USCG 




                                                 
54 Coastal Health District Homepage.   www.gachd.org.  [accessed February 5, 2007]. 
55 Marine Exchange of Alaska Homepage.   http://www.mxak.org/regulations/33CFR/33cfr6.01.htm. 
[accessed February 4, 2007]. 
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4. United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
The CBP is an agency of the Department of Homeland Security and bears 
responsibility for border protection and security.  CBP enforces all laws and regulations 
of the U.S. federal government related to importation, exportation, traveler admissibility 
issues and immigration policies.  The Port of Savannah is a cargo seaport and containers 
are risk-rated in accordance with the Container Security Initiative.56  The most common 
violations noted in Savannah are narcotics, trade violations, pre-cursor chemicals, food 
items and stowaways.  CBP is tasked with the responsibility of ensuring that crewmen are 
eligible for admission into the United States as well as detecting if there are any travelers 
with illnesses that may be of public health significance.57  Most vessels arriving in 
Savannah are from Asia increasing the potential introduction of a novel strain of  avian 
influenza or some other newly emerging or reemerging infection that is circulating in that 
part of the world.  The usual passage from Asia is two to four weeks, but crewmen may 
join the vessel at any port, which increases the potential that a disease may still be in the 
incubation phase with no signs of infection until the crewman has arrived in the United 
States.  Crewmen are of many nationalities, which increase the potential risk of the 
introduction of novel infections from diverse sources.58     
In summary, enablers to the lateral mechanism included the interest and value 
placed upon learning the roles, responsibilities and daily operation of each core agency.  
Therefore from the barrier characterized by the lack of understanding and knowing the 
organizational mandates, regulations and mission of each agency identified at the 
November 9 meeting, an enabler to the social network of the stakeholders was created by 
educating and understanding one another.  At the January 2006 education meeting, the 
benefits of understanding each agency’s regulatory requirements and of forming an 
interagency relationship were broadened to the operational staff level.  
 
                                                 
56 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “CSI: Container Security Initiative.“ 
www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/.  [accessed February 5, 2007]. 
57 Annette Coppola (Supervisory CBP Officer, Presentation at the Customs House, Savannah, 
Georgia) November 9, 2005. 
58  Ibid.  
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D. PURPOSE AND STRATEGY 
Thomas et al describe purpose and strategy as driven by a commonly perceived 
risk, threat, or goal resulting in a shared purpose and willingness to adapt the 
collaborative effort to the interests of other participating agencies.59  The dead bird 
incident provided a purpose to initiate the collaborative process and underscored the need 
for a unified mechanism to support decision making and information sharing.  Each of 
the stakeholders recognized the existing confusion regarding jurisdictional roles and 
responsibilities of the other agencies in response to a biosecurity threat at the seaport and 
the existing gaps and barriers in the process that the incident made evident. In addition, 
the threat of pandemic influenza provided an urgent need to address these issues.    
Compliance with disease reporting regulations for governmental and private 
industry workers is challenging in several respects: 
• Identification of all stakeholders involved was not initially known. 
• Knowledge of the mandates, regulations and mission of each stakeholder 
was not known.  
• Vessel masters, port industry and governmental workers may have been 
unaware of disease reporting regulations.  
• Straightforward notification policies, protocols and procedures to 
facilitate reporting were not in place. 
•  Confusion existed over which agency to notify and what circumstances 
should be reported.   
• Workers lacked training to recognize, detect, report and respond to 
naturally occurring or bioterrorism disease events. 
• Workers lacked expertise in identifying high-risk health issues that 
demand urgent public health intervention.   
• Education of all stakeholders was difficult because so many different 
entities from both the private and public sector were involved. 
•  Economic pressures to keep commerce moving and avoiding any delays 
in port were barriers to reporting uncertain circumstances.   
The purpose and strategy of the interagency collaborative planning process was to 
address and begin to solve these identified challenges by developing partnerships and 
team group as illustrated in Figure 2.                                                    
59  Thomas, Hocevar, and Jansen, A Diagnostic Approach to Building Collaborative Capacity in an 
Interagency Context, 7. 
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Figure 2.   Biological Threat Detection and Control: Process; Working with Stakeholder 
Agencies to Develop Interagency Collaboration 
 
Interactive analysis of response to the dead bird incident and a review of agency 
roles led to the identification of the following areas described as strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats (SWOT) as shown in Figure 3. Strengths included the existence 
of federal and state regulations that provide jurisdictional authority for efforts to detect 
and respond to incidents and the collective expertise of the group and willingness of the 
stakeholders to participate in collaborative planning.  Weaknesses were identified as not 
having Quarantine Officers stationed in Savannah to screen and respond to incidents, and 
the lack of clear procedures, policies, training and awareness among stakeholders, 
particularly port industry workers.  The threats included unacceptable delays in 
commerce that result in economic losses and jurisdictional squabbles related to 
overlapping responsibilities. These threats were identified as barriers to the development 
of public-private partnerships in a collaborative protocol.  The opportunities to create 
new partnerships, improve information sharing, and enhance surveillance for early 
detection and implementation of effective disease control interventions was seen as an 
exciting prospect to overcome existing weaknesses and barriers. 
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Figure 3.   Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities Threats (SWOT) Analysis  (After Strategic 
Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations) 
 
The SWOT analysis clarified the purpose and strategy for collaborative planning 
summarized in the four action framework shown in Figure 4 and guided the process for 
protocol development.  In this framework, priorities to reach the desired outcome of 
healthy people and a healthy community were identified.  These priorities included the 
reduced response time of public health to detect, intercept and mitigate a potential 
biothreat to the community.  This would occur through new partnerships, protocols for 
notification, training opportunities for all stakeholders and unified efforts resulting in 
improved awareness, information sharing, communication, cooperation and surveillance.   
The result of these efforts would eliminate confusion, barriers to information sharing and 
seams in the process. 
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Figure 4.   Public-Private Partnerships for Disease Control (After Blue Ocean Strategy) 
 
E. PEOPLE COMPONENT 
An important component for successful collaboration is that people involved in 
the process had the ability to appreciate others’ interests and views, and to build trust, 
commitment and motivation among themselves.60  All of the core work group members 
exhibited a high degree of respect and appreciation for the professionalism and expertise 
of the other members and were highly motivated to participate in this process due to the 
benefits that could be achieved through a seamless, coordinated and timely process and 
the impact of a failed response.  
                                                 
60  Thomas, Hocevar, and Jansen, A Diagnostic Approach to Building Collaborative Capacity in an 
Interagency Context, 8. 
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The Ports of Savannah and Brunswick are located in Chatham and Glynn 
Counties, respectively.  Protocol development and approval from local responders outside 
of public health were achieved through a series of meetings that included Emergency 
Management Agency, EMS, hospital, law enforcement, and local Federal Bureau of 
Investigation personnel.  
As the group grew in scope, meetings became harder to facilitate and manage 
until it was decided to reduce the work group to the core agencies to maintain 
effectiveness.  The final products were developed and presented to the larger stakeholder 
group for final approval.  The larger stakeholder group primarily represented Chatham 
County (Savannah) agencies while the core work group consisted of agencies with 
regional jurisdiction for the coastal region of Georgia.  The scope of the Infectious 
Disease Evaluation and Response Plan was regional with applicability to the Port of 
Brunswick and required buy-in from agencies serving Glynn County.   
 In Glynn County, the protocol was presented at a specially called meeting held in 
November 2006, which included all local players.  The protocol was approved after 
discussion and notation of the unique variances at this locale.  The Port of Brunswick 
includes terminals that are located within the City of Brunswick and Glynn County.  
Either county or city EMS may respond to a 911 call.  Southeast Georgia Health System 
Brunswick Campus developed a Seafarers’ Program in 2002 that provided quick and easy 
access to medical care for crewmen on international vessels.  The Health System offered 
medical support as an adjunct to this program that would mobilize to any port response 
incident and would be activated at the request of public health.  The program established 
a mechanism for rapid triage in the Emergency Department so that the crewman could 
receive treatment and return to the vessel before the scheduled departure.   
Extending applicability of the protocol to the Port of Charleston was facilitated by 
the participation and contribution of the Health Director of the Trident Health District, 
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC).  DHEC was 
simultaneously developing an infectious disease protocol for South Carolina and decided 
to work collaboratively with the group from Savannah to achieve a regional product.  The 
ATL QS also had a strong interest in a regional protocol to standardize the process within 
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their jurisdictional area.  The Marine Safety Unit of Savannah is part of Sector 
Charleston, which simplified USCG participation in the regional expansion of the 
protocol. 
The willingness of the core work group to seek input from the local stakeholders 
and to encourage them to adjust the procedure to meet local requirements was an enabler 
to the collaborative process.  Each locale had different agency structures with variations 
in the local norms for emergency preparedness.  This openness demonstrated respect and 
confidence for the people and agencies in each locale, while maintaining a consistent 
framework for response across the region.  
Another challenge was in the area of establishing the Incident Command 
Structure (ICS).  The group decided upon a Unified Command Structure (UC) to manage 
the incident, but the mechanism for actually achieving this objective was ambiguous.  
Challenges also included the fact that ATL QS staff was located in Atlanta and therefore, 
the UC would initially be established by conference call.  UC would be established at the 
Emergency Operation Center (EOC) under the jurisdiction of the Emergency 
Management Agency in the affected county, should the incident exceed the scope or 
jurisdiction of the core agencies.   
Communication channels and flow of agency notification were other significant 
challenges.  Communication flow between local, state and federal agencies was a topic of 
much discussion.  The ATL QS staff depend on CBP and local health officials to provide 
on-scene evaluation and response.  Normal communication flow is from local to state to 
federal levels, yet the initial flow may be from federal to local as the incident unfolds.  
An ambiguity exists if federal agencies communicate directly with local agencies for 
incident management.  This ambiguity was addressed through open dialogue and solved 
by the directive for immediate notification of all core agencies for any level of activation. 
A variation of the communication flow issue resurfaced as a result of the shipping 
agents survey findings that indicated port industry members would prefer to 
communicate directly with USCG officers for any suspicion of illness among crewmen.  
This was not in alignment with the federal regulations that require direct notification to 
the ATL QS.  Port industry officials may be more willing to comply with disease 
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reporting if encouraged to contact those with whom they are most comfortable 
communicating.  Educational efforts for port industry will encourage direct contact with 
the ATL QS, in compliance with regulations. 
Facilitation of the discussions surrounding these and other issues required 
openness, honestly, trust and respect for others’ opinions and the mission and roles of 
each agency.  A democratic leadership style of the members of the core work group 
contributed to the success of this collaborative initiative through consensus building.  
Leadership for this process was provided by each of the core agencies involved, but 
public health provided the organizational framework for the process.  The main barrier to 
the people factor was due to the numbers of agencies involved in the response to a 
biosecurity incident and applicability to different locales. 
F. INCENTIVES 
There must be some “payoff” or incentive to motivate each agency to invest, 
support and commit to the successful collaborative planning process.61  Each of the core 
agencies recognized the benefits and opportunities that could be achieved through 
collaborative partnerships for a unified response.  Forging new public-private 
partnerships that included local, state, and federal resources would improve disease 
detection, multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional communication and notification, 
information sharing, decreased response time, increase effectiveness of control measures, 
reduced transmission rates, provide appropriate medical care for ill persons, reduce 
impact to the workforce, improve public safety and increase situational awareness of 
biosecurity (see Figure 5).  Data sources for expanded syndromic surveillance were 
investigated as a public health method to increase the likelihood of detection of infectious 
diseases among travelers and mitigate the spread of the disease.  The value and benefits 
that were achieved through new partnerships and a collaborative, unified response is 
shown graphically in Figure 5.  
                                                 
61  Thomas, Hocevar, and Jansen, A Diagnostic Approach to Building Collaborative Capacity in an 
Interagency Context, 7. 
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Figure 5.   Value Curve Analysis for Partnerships (After Blue Ocean Strategy) 
 
Outputs of the collaborative planning process included the development of the 
following products to improve disease detection, response, control and mitigation of the 
impact on the community. 
• Survey of the attitudes, knowledge and practice of shipping agents in 
response to a crewman who is ill. 
• Development and implementation of geo-cluster syndromic surveillance 
for EMS dispatches to the Port of Savannah.  
• Infectious Disease Evaluation and Response Plan at the Georgia Seaports 
These products are described in the following chapter.  They hopefully provide a 




mitigation of the impact from the emerging or reemerging infections from international 
sources on the community, with the ultimate outcome of healthy people, healthy 
workforce and a healthy community. 
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III. PRODUCTS 
The priorities that were established by the core work group included reduced 
response time of public health to detect, intercept and mitigate a potential biothreat to the 
community through creating new partnerships, protocols for notification, training 
opportunities for all stakeholders and unified effort.  These priorities were translated into 
the production of a survey of shipping agents to determine their attitudes, knowledge and 
practice in response to a crewman who is ill; development and implementation of geo-
cluster syndromic surveillance for EMS dispatches to the Port of Savannah; and 
development of the Infectious Disease Evaluation and Response Plan, as illustrated in 
Figure 6.  Deployment of these products will hopefully eliminate confusion, barriers to 
information sharing and seams in the process of biological threat detection, interception, 
and mitigation through heightened situational awareness, communication, surveillance 
and coordinated, collaborative response.  A detailed description of these products is 
included for consideration of the applicability to other communities with cargo seaports.  
The Infectious Disease Evaluation and Response Plan is included in its entirety and is 
offered as a starting point for local health departments and other stakeholders engaged in 
collaborative initiatives with their state and federal partners.  This plan delineates each 
partner’s role, authority and channel of communication in minimizing the risk of 
microbial threats of public health significance entering the United States. 
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Figure 6.   Communicable Disease Detection and Control: Products of Interagency 
Participation and Collaboration 
 
A. SHIPPING AGENT SURVEY 
1. Background 
The importance of collaborating with the shipping agents was recognized early in 
the planning process.  A plan was formulated to survey the knowledge, attitudes, and 
practice of shipping agents in response to sick crewmen to provide an understanding of 
their role and to assess their educational needs.  This information was used to formulate 
clear guidelines for disease reporting and to begin developing an effective training 
program.  The social network fostered through regular attendance at meetings resulted in 
positive communications between public health and private industry representatives.  
Shipping agent participation in development of the response plan was conducive to 
cooperation in the operational phase.  The survey goal was to gain understanding of the 
gaps and barriers in the communicable disease reporting process and to engage the 




The shipping agent survey was designed to quantitatively analyze the shipping 
agents knowledge, attitudes, practices for responding to sick crewmen and reporting 
notifiable diseases to the CDC Quarantine Station.  The survey was administered through 
use of an on-line service and design software with an invitation to participate that was 
distributed by email link to the survey platform.  Survey questions were related to 
bioterrorism, naturally occurring diseases, response to a sick crewman, and interaction 
with public health.  A pre-test group of Naval Postgraduate School Masters in Homeland 
Security students with experience in maritime issues was used to refine the tool through 
simplification of medical terms and the addition of definitions. 
The population was identified as port industry members of the Savannah 
Maritime Association.  A total of fifty-six email invitations were distributed, thirteen 
were returned with invalid email addresses, for a total of forty three received invitations.  
A series of four reminder emails was sent during the collection phase of the survey that 
was conducted from October 1 through November 12, 2006.   
A total of twenty-three responses were received for a 53% response rate.  
Individual questions had a much lower response rate.  Responses were scored on a Likert 
scale of one through five with an average score less than 2.5 indicating disagreement with 
the statement and a score greater than 3.5 indicating agreement.  A score of 2.5 through 
3.5 indicated a neutral response.  A choice of “Don’t Know” was given, but not scored 
numerically and omitted from the denominator.   
Savannah Maritime Association members were asked to discuss and validate the 
survey results during their regular business meeting on November 15, 2006, with 
approximately thirty members in attendance.  An informal focus group among attendees 
was conducted after the results of the survey (giving raw scores assuming only a score 3 






3.  Quantitative Results 
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I have a legal responsibility to report a suspected bioterrorism 
incident at my port
I know who to call to report a suspected bioterrorism incident 
at my port
I need more training to protect myself, my employees and my 
clients in the event of a bioterrorism incident
Bioterrorism
Bioterrorism means:  An attack using biological agents, such as bacteria or viruses to spread disease.
Prepared means: ready.
US Seaports are prepared for a bioterrorism attack
My port is prepared for a bioterrorism attack
My agency is prepared for a bioterrorism attack
I have a personal responsibility to report a suspected 
bioterrorism incident at my port
 
Table 1.   Shipping Agent Survey:  Bioterrorism 
 
Among the respondents with an opinion, most disagreed that the U.S. seaports, 
the Port of Savannah and their agency were prepared to respond to a bioterrorist incident 
(see Table 1).  Most agreed that they had a personal and legal responsibility to report 
incidents, knew who to call to report an incident, but needed more education and training 
on protection from a bioterrorism incident.  For any question, between one and four 
(range) respondents did not have an opinion to the question, average 2.0, median 1.5.  
 











Naturally Occurring Contagious Disease
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US Seaports are prepared for naturally occurring contagious 
disease events
My port is prepared for naturally occurring contagious disease 
events
My agency has policies for naturally occurring contagious 
disease events
I have a legal responsibility to report a naturally occurring 
contagious disease event at my port
I know who to call to report a suspected naturally occurring 
contagious disease events at my port
I need more training to protect myself, my employees and my 
clients in the event of a naturally occurring contagious disease 
event
I have a personal responsibility to report a suspected naturally 
occurring contagious disease events at my port
A naturally occurring contagious disease is a disease that is easily spread from one person to another such as Tuberculosis, SARS, 
Yellow Fever or Cholera.
 
Table 2.   Shipping Agent Survey:  Naturally Occurring Contagious Disease 
 
Among the respondents with an opinion, they were neutral (between 2.5 and 3.5) 
about U.S. seaports, the Port of Savannah, or their agency (having policies) being 
prepared for naturally occurring contagious disease events.  Most agreed that they had a 
personal and legal responsibility to report, knew who to report to, but needed more  
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training for protection in the event of naturally occurring contagious diseases (see Table 
2).  For any question, between one and three (range) respondents did not have an opinion 
to the question, average 1.5, median 1.0.  
 











Contagious Illness On-Board a Vessel
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I need more training to protect myself, my employees and my 
clients in the event of a contagious illness on board a vessel
Crewman that is sick with symptoms of a contagious disease, such as fever, cough, or diarrhea, and is on-board a vessel that is 







I know who to call to report a contagious illness on board a 
vessel at my port
My port is prepared for a contagious illness on board a vessel
My agency has policies for a contagious illness on board a 
vessel
I have a legal responsibility to report a suspected contagious 
illness on board a vessel.
I have a personal responsibility to report a suspected 
contagious illness on board a vessel
US Seaports are prepared for a contagious illness on board a 
vessel
 
Table 3.   Shipping Agent Survey: Contagious Illness On-Board a Vessel  
 
Among those who had an opinion, respondents were neutral (between 2.5 and 3.5) 
in their answers about U.S. seaports, their port, or their agency (having policies) being 
prepared to respond to crewmen who were sick with symptoms of a contagious disease 
on-board a vessel (see Table 3).  Most agreed that they had a personal and legal 
responsibility to report the occurrence, knew who to call to report the event, but needed 
more training on protecting themselves or others.  For any question, between two and 
four (range) did not have an opinion to the question, average 2.5, median 2.0.  Therefore, 
the individual question response rate for those with opinions was no greater than 35%. 
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Contagious Illness in Crewman on Shore
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3.62My agency would be alert for signs of illness in other crewman 
that were with the sick crewman
My agency would arrange medical care for a crewman with a 
contagious illness
I have a personal responsibility to report a suspected 
contagious illness in a crewman on shore
My agency has policies to deal with a contagious illness in a 
crewman on shore
I know who to call to report a contagious illness in a crewman 
on shore
I have a legal responsibility to report a contagious illness in a 
crewman
I need more training to protect myself, my employees and my 
clients in the event of a contagious illness in a crewman on 
shore
Crewman that is sick with symptoms of a contagious disease and has been cleared by Customs and Border Protection to come 
ashore.
 
Table 4.   Shipping Agent Survey:  Contagious Illness in Crewman on Shore 
 
Among respondents with an opinion, they believed their agency would be alert for 
signs of illness (Score: 3.62) and would arrange medical care (Score: 3.77) for a crewman 
with a contagious illness; however, they were neutral (Score: 2.73) in regard to their 
agency having policies to deal with such a person (see Table 4).  Most respondents 
agreed that they had a personal (Score: 4.07) and legal (Score: 3.86) responsibility to 
report, knew who to call to report (Score: 3.75), but agreed that more training was needed 
(Score: 3.75) for protection from a crewman with a contagious disease occurring after 
being clearing by CBP.    For any question, between one and four (range) respondents did 
not know an answer, and average and median were 2.5.  For any question, at most only 
fifteen (35% response rate) respondents had an opinion.  
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I have a legal responsibility to report a contagious disease that 
may result in quarantine of a vessel
I have a role in supporting a quarantine order issued by the 
CDC Quarantine Station
US Seaports are prepared to quarantine a vessel to prevent 
the spread of a contagious disease
My port is prepared to quarantine a vessel to prevent the 
spread of a contagious disease
My agency is prepared to quarantine a vessel to prevent the 
spread of a contagious disease
I have a personal responsibility to report a contagious disease 
that may result in quarantine of a vessel
A period of time during which a vehicle, person, or material suspected of carrying a contagious disease is detained at a port of entry.
 
Table 5.   Shipping Agent Survey:  Quarantine 
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Among those respondents with an answer, most agreed that U.S. Seaports and the 
Port of Savannah were prepared to impose a quarantine order, but were neutral (Score: 
3.43) in their opinion regarding their own agency.  Most agreed that they have a personal 
(Score: 4.29) and legal (Score: 4.29) responsibility to report the occurrence of a 
contagious disease that may result in quarantine of a vessel and that they have a role in 
supporting this order (Score: 3.62).  For any question, no more than fourteen had an 
opinion; <33% response rate for any question. 
 











Communication with Public Health
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My agency maintains contact information for the CDC 
Quarantine Station in Atlanta
Quarantine Station staff are available 24/7
Includes local health department, Georgia Division of Public Health or Centers for Disease Control
My agency maintains contact information for local public 
health officials
I would call the CDC Quarantine Station about a crewman with 
a contagious disease
Local public health officials are available 24/7
I would call the local health department about a crewman with 
a contagious disease 
 
Table 6.   Shipping Agent Survey:  Communicating with Public Health 
 
Among respondents with an answer, only for the question would you call the local 
health department (Score: 3.79) about a crewman with a contagious disease was the 
answer in agreement (Table 6).  Between ten and thirteen respondents had an opinion for 
any question in this section but, in five of the six questions the results were neutral 
(between 2.5 and 3.5). 
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Terrorist attack using a nuclear device
I have a personal responsibility to report a suspected a nuclear 
attack at my port
I know who to call to report a suspected a nuclear attack at 
my port
I need more training to protect myself, my employees and my 
clients in the event of a nuclear attack
US Seaports are prepared for a nuclear attack
My agency is prepared for a nuclear attack
My port is prepared for a nuclear attack
 
Table 7.   Shipping Agent Survey:  Nuclear Attack 
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Shipping agents were asked to respond to questions regarding a nuclear attack in 
order to compare their response to the nuclear attack question with their response to the 
question regarding bioterrorism preparedness.  Among those with an opinion, most 
disagreed that U.S. ports, the Port of Savannah or their agency (Score: 1.93) were 
prepared for a nuclear attack.  Most agreed that they have a personal responsibility but, 
were neutral as far as knowing who to call (Score: 3.5) to report suspicion of activities 
that may result in a nuclear attack (Table 7).  Most agreed that more training was needed 
on this subject (Score: 3.93).  At most fourteen respondents answered any question with 
an opinion; <33% response rate for any question. 
4. Qualitative Results 
The limitations of this survey are recognized because of the limited population, 
low response rate, and multiple neutral and ‘don’t know’ answers.  Therefore, the 
opportunity was taken to engage the shipping agents in an informal focus group 
discussion regarding their knowledge, attitudes and practices in responding to a sick 
crewman.  Findings of the focus group discussions indicated that maritime industry 
members may not have a clear understanding of the nature of a bioterrorist threat, how to 
recognize an attack, or what to do when it happens.  Most agreed that they have a 
responsibility to report and respond to such an activity, but do not really know where or 
how they fit into the larger picture.  Most shipping agents agreed that port preparedness 
to deal with bioterrorism and other naturally occurring disease events should be 
improved.  Most respondents agreed that they have a responsibility to report 
bioterrorism-related incidents but were less sure about their role in reporting naturally 
occurring diseases.  Industry members were unclear about the signs and symptoms of 
illness that warrant a report to public health and asked for clear guidance to be provided 
to them regarding this subject.  The group agreed that a sick crewman would be taken to 
the local hospital emergency department for treatment or to the agent’s company 
physician, if there was one available.  One shipping agent stated that the vessel master 
would always notify the shipping agent if there was a sick crewman on board, but other 
shipping agents did not agree.  The group agreed that they would be most likely to report 
the occurrence of a sick crewman to the USCG rather than to CBP, the ATL QS or local 
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public health.  The consistent theme that emerged was that industry members need more 
training and awareness on infectious disease and reporting issues.    
5. Discussion 
The crude tabulated results of the survey presented during a regular meeting of 
the Savannah Maritime Association on November 15, 2005, provided an opportunity for 
group discussion and education of public health and the maritime industry.  Because of 
the low response rate in general and to specific questions, and the lack of any clear 
opinion for the majority of questions, scientific validity or generalization of the results to 
the larger population could not be assumed.  The qualitative discussion at the Savannah 
Maritime Association added credibility to the premise that the quantitative results 
reflected gaps in knowledge and skills of the group at large.  Open discussion provided an 
opportunity for consensus building on the validity of the interpretations of the results and 
defining the port industry’s role in response to a bioterrorist event or natural outbreak of 
an infectious disease at the Georgia seaports.  However, the Savannah Maritime 
Association membership is limited in scope and location in comparison to the entire 
population of shipping agents conducting business in the United States and further 
research is needed to ascertain whether the results are reflective of the population at 
large.  Therefore, the survey results and informal focus group findings indicated a 
willingness of port industry personnel to comply with disease notification procedures 
once they know and understand these procedures.   
B. SYNDROMIC SURVEILLANCE 
1. Background 
Syndromic surveillance uses pre-existing, automated, electronically transmitted, 
pre-diagnostic, clinical data generated in real time for medical intelligence.  Its overall 
purpose is to facilitate the early detection of outbreaks and other events that may be of 
public health significance.  Syndromic Surveillance also may provide an indication of the 
health status of a given community by increasing situational awareness. Syndromic 
surveillance systems are designed to capture and analyze data that may reveal statistically 
significant anomalies in disease and injury events prior to clinical diagnosis.  It involves 
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live analysis of data to identify aberrations as they emerge, rather than waiting for 
conventional detection methods.  One goal of syndromic surveillance systems is to 
increase epidemiological capacity to monitor and respond to community health events in 
the early stages of the events that may prove to be of public health significance.  This can 
occur when patients present to emergency departments or ambulatory care centers, or call 
911 for possible EMS transport to a hospital.  Syndromic surveillance systems generate a 
flag or alert when a syndrome, such as clinical classification of chief complaints for 
visiting to a clinic or hospital, or calling 911 and dispatching an ambulance, occurs at 
numbers that are greater than expected.  This provides epidemiologists with the 
opportunity to initiate preliminary validation possibly followed by investigation activities 
to determine if a disease outbreak or other event of public health significance is 
unfolding.62   
The CHD developed and implemented with the help of GDPH its current 
syndromic surveillance system as a component of the preparedness effort for the G8 
Summit held on Sea Island, Georgia in June, 2004.  Data sources included chief 
complaints for hospital emergency department visits and 911 calls/EMS dispatches, and 
types of over-the-counter pharmaceutical sales.  These sources have continued since 
implementation of the system with periodic enhancements.  Data are analyzed to identify 
syndromes (classifications) with numbers greater than expected and provide email 
notification of an aberration flag for priority syndromes associated with outbreaks or 
seasonal disease trends to public health that something unusual might be occurring.   
FirstWatch® is a vendor-based service that provides syndromic surveillance for 
911 calls with EMS dispatches.63 Using a secure file transfer process, FirstWatch® 
gathers real-time data from MedStar (EMS Provider) 911 calls in Savannah.  The real-
time data are compared with historical, cumulative summary and geographic patterns.   
 
 
                                                 
62  James W. Buehler and others, "Framework for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems for 
Early Detection of Outbreaks," Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, Centers for Disease Control 53, 
no. RR05 (May 7, 2004).  www.cdc.gov/mmwR/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5305a1.htm.  [accessed February 5, 
2007]. 
63  First Watch Early Warning System Homepage.  www.firstwatch.net.  [accessed February 5, 2007]. 
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When an aberration is detected, FirstWatch® generates an alert to allow notification and 
subsequent evaluation of the data and possibly raise the question of a trend or pattern by 
local and state public health.   
Specifically, FirstWatch® uses four analysis methods and provides a number of 
approaches for alerting.  Each syndrome includes its own criteria, alerting thresholds, 
alerting methods, and notification list.  
 Analysis Methodologies include:  
1. Actual Events compares current number of events in the syndrome with a 12-
month historical average of the syndrome for day of week and hour of day.  
When the number of observed (current) events is three standard deviations 
above the historical average for the syndrome, an email alert is generated 
2. Syndrome to All generates a ratio of the number of events within the 
syndrome to all 911 calls and EMS dispatches for the service at that time.  
The threshold is determined using the twelve-month historical data for the 
events and email alert is generated when the threshold is crossed. 
3. Modified Cumulative Summary compares current events in the syndrome 
with a 14-day rolling average for that syndrome.  When the number of 
observed (current) events is three standard deviations above the rolling 
average for the syndrome, an email alert is generated. 
4. Geo-Cluster monitors the number of events within the syndrome for a specific 
geographical location. 
Savannah EMS providers are focused on the incident response and would 
probably not manually notify public health of a call to the seaport.  This syndromic 
surveillance infrastructure provides the notification, early detection and a warning system 
to evaluate a biosecurity threat and respond accordingly.  
A FirstWatch® notification allows local and state public health officials to 
evaluate the data generating the alert and begin to interpret the circumstance.   The 
monitored syndromes are designed to detect outbreaks, seasonal trends, bioterrorism 
events, and injury events.  Certain medical events or law enforcement/ public safety 
concerns are captured in “sentinel” events, such as a hostage situation or a bomb scare by 





Initial exploration of possible data sources for syndromic surveillance included 
absences or selected reported illnesses among the Georgia Ports Authority, USCG or 
CBP employees, but none of these agencies tracked these data electronically.  The idea of 
establishing a syndromic surveillance system was abandoned temporarily.  MedStar EMS 
staff stated at one of the meetings that they likely would not notify public health of a call 
to the seaport.  MedStar was a FirstWatch® customer and the idea of establishing a 
geographic cluster for the seaport was initiated.   
FirstWatch® developers identified the specific geographical location of the Port 
of Savannah with assistance from MedStar EMS as illustrated in Figure 7.  Sixteen 
geographic zones were established into this geo-cluster, as illustrated in Figure 8.  Public 
health and FirstWatch® identified the syndromes that would alert public health of a 911 
call/EMS dispatch to the identified geographic location or geo-cluster.  Syndromes 
included complaints of abdominal pain, respiratory symptoms, seizure, headache, cardiac 
arrest, unconsciousness, syncope, fainting, contagious disease, elevated temperature, 
dehydration, edema, dizziness, diarrhea, anxiety, allergic reaction, weakness, altered level 
of consciousness, sick person, dead person, or an unknown medical problem.  These 
syndromes would be alerted if the current number of events in that syndrome exceeded 
historical levels, cumulative summary, or average expected number of events by three 
standard deviations.  Sentinel events were identified as a hazardous material incident, 
toxic exposure, bomb threat, explosion or blast, suicide attempt, barricaded person, 
hostage situation, civil disturbance, riot, or suspicious package or substance; only one 




Figure 7.   Savannah Harbor (From FirstWatch®) 
 
 






This FirstWatch® geo-cluster of the Port of Savannah has resulted in notification 
to public health of events occurring there.  The following is one such example.  A minor 
industrial accident causing a diesel fuel spill (sentinel event) within the Savannah Harbor 
geo-cluster resulted in a FirstWatch® alert to public health on September 17, 2006.  Eight 
victims were decontaminated and transported to a local hospital for medical assessment; 
they were discharged home in good condition following the incident.  Public health 
officials were able to monitor the condition of the victims and the environmental impact 
to the community as a result. 
4. Discussion 
While limited in scope, the FirstWatch® geo-cluster for the Savannah seaport 
does provide a mechanism to enhance communication between public health and EMS, 
and provides a window of opportunity to establish coordination among the USCG, CBP 
and the receiving hospital facility.  The defined geographical area accurately delineates 
the Port of Savannah, which results in few alert notifications.   The value of the system is 
in the acquisition of automated information.  Public health can initiate radio or phone 
contact with EMS, USCG or CBP to investigate the nature of the EMS call to the port in 
the event that notification by these agencies to public health has not occurred.   
Public health response to a FirstWatch® alert is graphically displayed in Figure 9.  
Due to the low rate of alerts, every incident would warrant contacting EMS to ascertain 
the nature of the call.  If the initial EMS assessment rules out an infectious process, the 
investigation is stopped or referred to the appropriate entity, such as the Environmental 
Protection Division.  If the call does seem related to an infectious disease, the verification 
process is initiated with notification to relevant stakeholders identified in the port 
response protocol.  Local public health may respond to the scene for further investigation 
and assessment.    
Phase I measures include the standard public health response to any contagious 
disease investigation of public health significance and would apply to serious, but 
traditional infectious diseases, such as tuberculosis or measles (see Figure 9).  Figure 9 
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shows that the steps to a response consist of implementation of immediate infection 
control measures to prevent the spread of the disease, case management, medical 
treatment, contact tracing and monitoring, and active surveillance for additional cases as 
the disease investigation progresses.  The response may include the use of infection 
control measures such as isolation, quarantine and prophylaxis of contacts for naturally 
occurring diseases, such as tuberculosis or measles.  These steps may be taken 
simultaneously as the situation dictates.  Phase II response would be applied to Category 
A or B diseases (see Appendix 2 for definitions) of public health significance that can be 
easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person, result in high mortality rates, 
such as smallpox or viral hemorrhagic fevers, and may include a forensic investigation 
component.  Emergency management and law enforcement personnel would always be 
activated in a Phase II response.   



































Figure 9.   Syndromic Surveillance Response to a Contagious Disease (After World Health 
Organization Rapid Response to Pandemic Influenza)64  
 
An adequate epidemiological capacity is essential to enhance the public health 
response to a natural or manmade biological event and includes a competent workforce 
monitoring and interpreting data received from reliable surveillance systems that provide 
                                                 
64 By A. Neu, W. Cameron, L. Smith and S. Cookson for this project. 
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early indicators of an infectious disease outbreak.  This FirstWatch® system generates 
alerts and notifications that result in the need to verify the data and if the alert seems 
plausible, might result in a disease outbreak investigation.  This investigation would rely 
on reliable clinical assessment, effective laboratory capacity, multi-agency cooperation, 
local, state, federal, and international agency cooperation, and effective risk 
communication with appropriate public response.  The ability to detect and respond early 
in a disease outbreak affords the best opportunity to implement effective control 
measures and contain the spread of disease.  Syndromic surveillance may offer an 
opportunity to increase the detection rate for infectious diseases among travelers. 
C.  INFECTIOUS DISEASE EVALUATION AND RESPONSE PLAN 
This collaborative effort to develop an Infectious Disease Evaluation and 
Response Plan supports the State of Georgia’s Strategic Plan for Terrorism Preparedness 
2006 goal to coordinate prevention, response and recovery activities with the Ports 
Authority of Georgia.  Strengthening the role of public health in port security will help 
“Prepare for a Safer Georgia,” the stated goal of Georgia’s Strategic Plan for Homeland 
Security.  This plan could possibly serve as a response model for other communities with 
seaports within the southeastern United States.65  A preliminary draft was formulated 
using the Hartsfield Atlanta Airport Plan as a template.66  The first draft of this plan was 
presented at a large multi-agency meeting, including public health officials from 
Charleston held in July 2006.  The plan was finally approved in December 2006, at a 
joint meeting held in Charleston with South Carolina and Georgia local and state public 
health, USCG Sector Charleston and CBP representatives.  The current version of the 
plan is presented in this section without local contact information and is offered as a 
resource to other agencies involved in collaborative planning initiatives to address 
challenges inherent in health screening at border crossings.  A list of participating 
agencies can be found in Appendix 1.   
                                                 
65 Georgia Strategic Plan for Homeland Security 2006 (Georgia Office of Homeland Security-Georgia 
Emergency Management Agency, Terrorism Emergency Response and Preparedness Division, 2006).  
www.gema.state.ga.us/ohsgemaweb.nsf/a29ce156b1dc53e185257118004368a/b7fa2c8c1cdd9b56852571a
9004a7a75?OpenDocument.  [accessed February 5, 2007]. 
66  Georgia Department of Human Resources, Georgia Division of Public Health, Infectious Disease 
Evaluation and Response Standard Operating Guide, Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, 
Draft, January  2006).   
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D. PROLOGUE 
The Georgia seaports are an extreme economic asset to the State of Georgia 
accounting for 276,000 jobs statewide, $35.4 billion in revenue, and $1.4 billion in state 
and local taxes.  The Port of Savannah, a military Strategic Port for U.S. Army 3rd 
Infantry Division, has experienced 10-15% growth every year for the past sixteen years.  
It is the fifth largest container port in the United States with over 3,000 vessel arrivals 
annually with future growth expected.67 
The Port of Brunswick, located approximately eighty miles south of Savannah, is 
one of the fastest growing auto and heavy machinery ports in North America.  The 
Colonels Island Terminal is utilized by twelve major auto manufacturers, supported by 
three auto processors. The terminal is the South Atlantic's fastest growing bulk export 
operation, including pulp and agricultural products from Georgia.  
E. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this standard operating plan (SOP) is to provide a coordinated 
response to an infectious disease event of potential public health significance at the 
Georgia seaports. Such a public health threat requires a comprehensive and collaborative 
response by multiple agencies in multiple jurisdictions, including local, regional, state, 
and federal assets to prevent or limit the spread of disease to the community.  The goal of 
this SOP is to enhance collaboration between public health agencies and other local, state 
and federal partners in seaport security in order to effectively detect, respond to and 
mitigate the effects of a bioterrorism attack or other infectious disease incident.   
Although all threats to public health are important, those associated with  
accidental or intentional chemical, radiological, improvised explosive devices, nuclear 




                                                 
67 Georgia Ports Authority Homepage.   http://www.gaports.com/index2.html.  [accessed February 5, 
2007]. 
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F. OPERATIONAL JURISDICTION 
The following agencies have a role in detecting and responding to an international 
traveler arriving in the United States who is ill with an infectious disease.  A description 
of their jurisdictional responsibilities in this regard is provided. 
1. Centers for Disease Control and Protection (CDC), Division of Global 
Migration and Quarantine, Atlanta Quarantine Station (ATL QS) 
The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services has statutory 
responsibility for preventing the introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable 
diseases in the United States. Under its delegated authority, the Division of Global 
Migration and Quarantine, works to fulfill this responsibility through a variety of 
activities, including the operation of Quarantine Stations at ports of entry, establishment 
of standards for medical examination of persons destined for the permanent U.S. 
settlement, and administration of interstate and foreign quarantine regulations, which 
govern the international and interstate movement of persons, animals, and cargo. The 
legal foundation for these activities is found in Titles 8 and 42 of the US Code for Federal 
Regulations (CFR) and relevant supporting regulations.68 The ATL QS has operational 
jurisdiction with authority to detain, medically examine or conditionally release 
individuals believed to be carrying a communicable disease of public health 
significance.69  The ATL QS bears primary responsibility in identifying and responding 
to human health risks arriving at all ports of entry in Georgia, Alabama, Arkansas, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee.   
2. Coastal Health District (CHD) 
The Coastal Health District (CHD) is entrusted by the State of Georgia with 
responsibility for the health of the community. The CHD serves Bryan, Camden, 
Chatham, Effingham, Glynn, Liberty, Long and McIntosh Counties. Its mission is to 
ensure conditions in which people can be healthy and to provide leadership in the 
prevention of disease and injury.  The CHD bears primary responsibility for the  
                                                 
68 Center for Disease Control, National Center for Infectious Diseases Homepage.   
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dq/lawsand.htm.  [accessed February 5, 2007]. 
69 42 CFR Parts 70 and 71. http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dq/lawsand.htm.  [accessed February 5, 2007]. 
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management and monitoring of individuals with a disease of public health significance 
upon disembarkation from an international vessel at the port and for the protection of the 
community against such a threat. 
3. Georgia Division of Public Health (GDPH)   
The Georgia Division of Public Health (GDPH) is an agency of the Georgia 
Department of Human Resources.  GDPH is the lead agency entrusted by the people of 
the State of Georgia with the ultimate responsibility for the health of communities and the 
entire population.  The vision of the GDPH is a Georgia with healthy people, families, 
and communities, where all sectors unite by pooling their assets and strengths to promote 
health for all. The GDPH provides service and leadership to each of the 18 health districts 
to promote, protect and improve the health and safety of the people of Georgia.  
4. United States Coast Guard (USCG) Sector Charleston 
Sector Charleston is responsible for all U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) operations in 
the States of Georgia and South Carolina. The Marine Safety Unit (MSU) Savannah 
jurisdiction has Captain of the Port authority over the ports of Savannah and Brunswick, 
Georgia. The Charleston Sector Commander is the Captain of the Port (COTP) for the 
ports of Little River, Georgetown, Charleston, and Port Royal, South Carolina. 
Every ship, when in a port of the United States, is subject to control by the federal 
government in so far as this control is directed toward verifying that the vessel is in 
compliance with international maritime conventions and U.S. law.  The 33 CFR Part 
6.04-8 gives the COTP the authority to "control the movement of any vessel within the 
territorial waters of the United States under his jurisdiction, whenever it appears to him 
that such action is necessary in order to secure such vessel from damage or injury, or to 
prevent damage or injury to any vessel or waterfront facility or waters of the United 
States".70  
Occasionally the USCG will receive information from boarding or inspection 
teams, vessel agents, shipping companies, masters of ships at sea, or elsewhere, notifying 
                                                 
70 Protection and Security of Vessels, Harbors, and Waterfront Facilities. 
http://www.mxak.org/regulations/33CFR/33cfr6.01.htm.  [accessed February 5, 2007]. 
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it of an ill crew member.  In the interest of public safety, the Coast Guard's goal is to 
notify public health officials of all shipboard illnesses as soon as possible to prevent the  
spread of communicable diseases.  If necessary, the COTP will impose controls on the 
vessels movements.  The USCG may assist in transporting medical services to a vessel to 
evaluate sick persons.  
5. United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), an agency of the Department of 
Homeland Security, is responsible for border protection and security.  CBP enforces all 
laws and regulations of the U.S. federal government related to importation, exportation, 
traveler admissibility issues and immigration policies.  
6. Port Industries (Port Authority and Vessel Services) 
Ports Authority personnel, stevedores and shipping agents are responsible for 
disease notification to the ATL QS and local public health. 
G. CONCEPTS OF OPERATION 
The term traveler is used in this SOP and includes international sailors and 
passengers arriving on a foreign vessel at the Georgia seaports.  
The term Coastal Health District includes county and district personnel under the 
supervision of the District Health Director.  
• Incident Management:  An Incident Command Structure (ICS) will be 
established to facilitate and coordinate the initial response by multiple 
agencies.  When this SOP is activated, the CHD, ATL QS, USCG, CBP, 
GDPH, local Emergency Management Agency and the Georgia Office of 
Homeland Security-Georgia Emergency Management Agency (OHS-
GEMA) will respond under a Unified Command (UC) as operational 
authorities.  Initially, UC will be established by conference call 
communication with USCG, CBP, ATL QS, GDPH and CHD 
participation.  If the incident expands beyond a limited public health 
concern, UC will be established at the Chatham or Glynn County 
Emergency Management Agency Emergency Operation Center as 
appropriate.   
• The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will assume the role of Incident 
Commander, if the incident involves one of the Category A diseases or a 
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credible threat of a federal offense.  If it involves a Category B disease, the 
FBI should at least be involved and their role determined as events unfold.  
• Based on the magnitude of the disease burden, potential for rapid spread, 
availability of mitigating strategies, and other factors, a local, state and/or 
federal emergency may be declared (Official Code of Georgia Section 38-
3-51).  
• Vessels are required to provide ninety-six-hour advance electronic notice 
of their arrival.  A disclosure is required at that time if there are any ill 
travelers on board.  An illness that meets federal criteria requires 
notification to the ATL QS and must be evaluated prior to disembarkation 
of the vessel. In the case of a death on board, it is also mandatory that the 
vessel master notifies the ATL QS. 
• Crew may join the vessel in any port.  An infected person would not 
exhibit signs and symptoms of illness, if the incubation period of the 
disease has not been completed prior to arrival in the United States.   The 
traveler may disembark from the vessel prior to the onset of symptoms.    
• Port industry or vessel services personnel are the most likely point of 
contact for travelers with illnesses that do not meet federal notification 
criteria during initial screening.  
• Travelers with minor illnesses that are cleared by CBP for admissibility to 
the United States are permitted to seek medical care on shore.  Port 
industry or vessel services may arrange medical services for sick travelers 
while in port. 
• Local health care providers may not recognize the significance of early 
presentation of symptoms compatible with international infectious 
diseases of public health significance because of the low incidence of 
these diseases in the United States. 
• The USCG may receive notification from boarding or inspection teams, 
vessel agents, shipping companies, or masters of ships at sea of a crew 
member or traveler with an illness.   
• CBP officers may be the first to identify an ill crew member or traveler 
and have primary responsibility to detain and refuse entry to persons 
suspected of being infected.   
• CBP officers will serve as the main point of contact at the Georgia Ports 
for emergency medical services (EMS) and others first responders that 
may evaluate a potential disease threat of public health significance.   
• The ATL QS, with support from the CHD, will assess the potential public 
health threat posed by the traveler’s illness and determine the immediate 
healthcare needs, disease control and prevention measures required. 
• A Public Health Assessment and Surveillance Team (PHAST) may be 
activated and deployed to the Ports of Savannah or Brunswick to conduct 
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public health field investigation activities.  The mission of the team is to 
perform public health assessment and surveillance, and make 
recommendations to the District Health Director.  The team is flexible in 
structure and is designed to meet the demands of the incident and may 
include an environmentalist, epidemiologist, nurse, physician and other 
public health specialist, as required. PHAST, assisted by EMS, will 
evaluate, treat, and arrange transport of the reported ill traveler to prevent 
further complications or unnecessary communicable disease exposures. 
• Public health, EMS or other healthcare providers and ancillary personnel 
will follow standard medical protocols when responding to travelers with 
suspected infectious diseases and use appropriate personal protective 
equipment (PPE).  During transport, the ill traveler should wear a surgical 
or N95 mask and skin rashes should be covered.  Exposure to blood, 
secretions, excretions or other potentially infectious materials is prevented 
through the use of standard precautions.  EMS providers in the patient care 
section of the transport unit will maintain an appropriate level of PPE to 
prevent spread of the disease. 
• The infectious traveler meeting federal criteria for a notifiable disease will 
be treated in a local medical treatment facility that is capable and willing 
to provide medical evaluation and treatment.  The ATL QS maintains a 
Memorandum of Understanding with St Josephs/ Candler Healthcare 
System in Savannah to establish a framework for the care and treatment of 
international travelers suspected to be infected with an infectious disease 
of public health significance.  Other district hospitals may also provide 
care. 
• The medical treatment facility will be consulted by CHD staff or EMS 
prior to transport of the traveler as indicated.  Upon arrival, the traveler 
will be immediately placed in the appropriate isolation area.  
• The attending physician will regularly consult with the District Health 
Director, State medical epidemiologist and ALT QS staff while 
determining the diagnosis and disposition of the traveler.   
• The ill traveler will have an assigned CHD epidemiologist to monitor 
progress of the case for any information pertinent to the epidemiologic 
investigation.  The CHD epidemiologist will regularly consult with the 
District Health Director, State medical epidemiologist and ALT QS staff  
• The Georgia Public Health Laboratory (GPHL) will supply the medical 
provider with appropriate resources for specimen collection and laboratory 
testing.  The CHD epidemiologist will coordinate specimen submission to 
the Georgia Public Health Laboratory. 
• The medical provider will obtain, package and transport clinical samples 
per GPHL protocol.  The CDC will provide confirmatory testing as 
indicated using standard protocol. 
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• Chain of Custody for all specimen collection is maintained if there is 
suspicion of illegal activity. 
• The Georgia State Patrol will provide transportation of clinical specimens 
to the GPHL and/or the CDC laboratory. 
• The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or other law enforcement 
agency investigating a credible threat of bioterrorism will coordinate the 
public health and medical response to the incident.  CHD and GDPH 
(Public Health) staff will comply with all aspects of the forensic 
investigation in gathering criminal and epidemiological evidence.   
• Public Health will evaluate and determine exposure of other travelers on 
board the vessel with the ill traveler.  Quarantine of exposed individuals 
may be determined to be a necessary control measure by the ATL QS.   
The purpose of quarantine is to limit mobility of travelers to prevent the 
spread of infection and to allow monitoring of the travelers’ health for 
signs and symptoms of the disease.   
• Public Health will provide information for exposed travelers to include 
clinical facts, laboratory results, and any appropriate medical and/or public 
health follow-up.  It is anticipated there may be a small group either 
refusing or not being able to be medically managed.  Coercion through 
law enforcement may be required based on individual circumstances under 
the direction of the UC. 
• Public Health will conduct enhanced and active surveillance with close 
monitoring of syndromic surveillance data sources.  Active surveillance 
will be conducted among quarantined travelers to include at least daily 
interviews designed to rapidly identify anyone who develops signs or 
symptoms consistent with a disease of public health significance.   
• The CHD Public Information Officer will coordinate with hospital, state 
and federal risk communicators in a Joint Information Center, while 
ensuring patient confidentiality and controlled release of essential 
information to the media. 
• Necessity for disinfection of the vessel will be determined by the ATL QS 
and coordinated through the USCG.  Local decontamination and 
environmental surety will be coordinated with OHS-GEMA, Georgia 
Department of Natural Resources, Environmental Protection Division, the 
Environmental Protection Agency and the GDPH. 
• The cost incurred by all agencies will be monitored and annotated 
routinely.  Their submission for reimbursement will be coordinated 
through the Unified Command Finance Section if there is a state or 




H. NOTIFICATION SCENARIOS 
Communication flow model is shown in Figure 10 with immediate notification of 











NOTE: crew member will not come forward unless very ill and CBP cleared
Port Industry, Port Authority and Vessel Services (Shipping Agents)
CBP, US Customs and Border Protection
CHD, Coastal Health District
PH, Public Health
USCG, US Coast Guard
EMS, Emergency Medical Services
CDC, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
OHS, GA Office of Homeland Security
NOTE: USCG only inspects a fraction of vessel that fall under security matrix  
Figure 10.   Illness Notification Web (From S. Cookson and D. Kim for this project) 
 
There are three possible notification scenarios to alert the ATL QS of a possible 
infectious disease threat that impacts communication channels and response: 
1. An ill traveler is reported to the ATL QS by the vessel master prior to 
entering the port (see Figure 11). 
2. An ill traveler is identified by the USCG or CBP officer during vessel 
inspection and screening procedures (see Figure 12). 
3. A traveler develops an illness while in port and under the supervision of 
vessel service staff. (see Figure 13). 
Communication channels and response will be discussed for each scenario. 
• General applied principles for the ill traveler(s) include: (1) physically 
separate from other people; (2) determine the need for immediate medical 
care; (3) assess potential for disease spread to other people; (4) when 
indicated, safely transport to one of the pre-designated medical treatment 
facilities (MTF) for isolation, further evaluation and care; and (5) provide 
alert notifications to other stakeholders.  
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• General applied principles for other travelers considered to have been 
exposed to the ill traveler include: (1) provide information on the illness, 
response, and health implications; (2) obtain complete contact 
information; (3) administer secondary prevention activities, such as 
providing vaccines or prophylactic medications; (4) determine and apply 
the need for quarantine; and (5) provide alert notifications to other 
stakeholders. 
A sequence of steps will be initiated from the point of notification of a person 
with a suspected disease of public health significance to final disposition of that person 
and any exposed individuals.  
Scenario I:  An ill traveler is reported to the CDC ATL QS by the vessel 
master prior to entering the port 
USCG
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Figure 11.   Notification Scenario:  Aware of Illness on Vessel  Before Inspection  
(From S. Cookson and D. Kim for this project) 
 
1) The vessel master reports a suspected infectious illness to 
the shipping agent.  
2)  The shipping agent notifies USCG and CBP.   
3) CBP notifies the CDC ATL QS and Coastal Health District.  
The State Public Health (GDPH) is notified by the ATL QS 
and the Coastal Health District. 
4) GDPH notifies the OHS/GEMA. 
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5) Unified Command is established. 
6) USCG will direct the vessel with the ill traveler on board to 
a predetermined area in the port. 
7) ATL QS determines further action based on initial 
information obtained from the calling source. 
8) The calling source provides the following preliminary medical 
information concerning the sick traveler: 
a) Nationality of traveler and availability of interpreter. 
b) Current clinical status; date of onset of symptoms; specific 
symptoms: any systemic, such as anorexia, malaise, 
myalgias; neurological such as headaches, paralysis; 
respiratory, including cough, fever, dyspnea at rest or on 
exertion, chest discomfort or pain; abdominal such as 
diarrhea, vomiting, nausea, abdominal cramps; skin 
manifestations such as rash; bleeding problems; and past 
medical history. 
c) Port of origin and brief travel history of the sick traveler. 
d) Contact with other persons with similar symptoms and if 
others on the vessel are ill. 
9) The ATL QS determines the need for further medical 
evaluation.  The ATL QS may request further medical 
evaluation of the case by local public health.  This 
evaluation will be obtained by on-site assessment by the 
Public Health Assessment and Surveillance Team (PHAST) 
and/or EMS as indicated.    
10) Immediate EMS dispatch is indicated if the condition is related to a 
non-infectious etiology or is life threatening.  On-site public health 
assessment is precluded in this situation.  EMS will immediately 
respond and transport the person to a local hospital using 
appropriate precautions.  Public health assessment would then 
proceed, either on-site at, or by phone with, the local hospital 
emergency department. 
11) If immediate EMS dispatch is not indicated, the PHAST members 
(nurses and/or physician), with support from EMS, will secure 
appropriate escort to board the vessel to assess and triage the sick 
traveler and quickly determine the health status of the remaining 
crew.  The sick traveler is moved to the deck of the vessel by 
previously exposed crewmen as an additional safety measure to 
improve ventilation and reduce risk of disease transmission.   
PHAST member(s) evaluate the sick crewman and record findings.  
Clinical information collected may include, but is not limited to:  
residence and demographics, two- week history of travel, 
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symptoms as listed above in #8 and other clinical assessment, as 
may be necessary on a case-by-case basis.  Consultation by phone 
or radio with UC may be obtained at any time during this process. 
12) Investigation, coordination and implementation of control 
measures, transport, quarantine and other on-site action 
steps are taken in consultation with the UC. 
13) Consultation with the involved shipping agent is done to 
ascertain if there are requirements in their medical 
protocols or procedures that would impact needed 
treatment. 
14) The best disposition of the case is determined.  Options 
include immediate transportation to a local hospital for 
urgent medical care, urgent/ routine transportation to the 
designated company physician, or recommendation to 
continue medical care with isolation (separate room, if 
possible) on board ship, with follow-up by the company 
physician.  
Scenario II:  An ill traveler is identified by CBP or USCG during screening 
procedures  
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Figure 12.   Notification Scenario:  Illness Noted During Inspection Process  
(From S. Cookson and D. Kim for this project) 
 
 
1. USCG or CBP officer notifies both agencies.   
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2. CBP notifies the appropriate shipping agent 
3. CBP notifies the CDC ATL QS and Coastal Health District.  The 
State Public Health (GDPH) is notified by the ATL QS and the 
Coastal Health District. 
4. GDPH notifies the OHS/GEMA 
5. Unified Command is established. 
6. Steps 8-14 above are followed. 
Scenario III:  A traveler develops an illness while in port and under the 
supervision of port industry staff. 
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Figure 13.   Notification Scenario:  Illness Noted After Disembarking  
(From S. Cookson and D. Kim for this project) 
 
1. The traveler is cleared by CBP, leaves the vessel and goes ashore. 
2. The traveler gets sick with signs and symptoms of a communicable 
disease.  
3. The traveler notifies the shipping agent, this might occur through 
the vessel master. 
4. The shipping agent arranges medical treatment with the company 
physician or dispatches EMS for transport to the hospital and 
notifies the USCG. 
5. USCG notifies CBP.   
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6. CBP notifies CDC ATL QS and Coastal Health District 
(CHD)/State Public Health (GDPH) 
7. EMS, the attending or emergency department physician notifies 
CHD of the case.  Initial medical evaluation results are 
communicated. 
8. CHD notifies the GDPH. 
9. GDPH notifies the CDC ATL QS and GEMA-OHS. 
 
10. Unified Command is established. 
11. Steps 12-14 above are followed. 
I.  PUBLIC INFORMATION 
The Joint Information Center (JIC) will operate under the UC and coordinate, 
review and clear all communication messages, methods and spokespersons for the 
following groups: 
• General public  
• Media 
• Patients  
• Passengers and crew (travelers) 
• Spokespersons 
• Ports Authority staff 
The JIC will work closely with those affected by the situation to ensure the most 
up-to-date and accurate information is disseminated.  The JIC will coordinate and prepare 
for site visits and potential statements from very important persons (VIPs), including, but 
not limited to city, county, state government officials, port officials, and federal officials. 
The JIC will designate spokespersons for each audience.  No personnel will speak with 
outside officials or media unless first coordinated through the JIC.   
The hospital Public Information Officer (PIO) will serve as a member of the JIC 
and coordinate any communication about the evolving clinical situation by the attending 
physician and staff to the media or public through the JIC.  This may include the patient’s 
laboratory results or status changes.  Patient confidentiality must be maintained.  The 
attending physician (emergency medicine or infectious diseases/internal medicine, if 
admitted) will communicate any changes in the patient’s laboratory results or status 
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changes directly with the District Health Director (DHD).  The DHD will notify the 
appropriate State Medical Epidemiologist and the ATL QS Medical Officer of the 
results/communications.   
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IV.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
As a result of the collaborative planning effort undertaken by local, state and 
federal agencies which have jurisdictional responsibilities to prevent the introduction of 
infectious disease threats of public health significance into the United States, a more 
effective process for detecting and responding to a microbial threat has been established 
at the Georgia Ports of Savannah and Brunswick.  Response capability and capacity has 
been expanded through a collaborative network with common objectives for enhanced 
information sharing, open communication channels, clarified agency roles and 
responsibilities, strengthened relationships and unified response.  The establishment of 
this network has increased the likelihood of early detection of a biological threat with 
implementation of effective disease control measures to mitigate the public health impact 
of such an event.   
The research questions for this project were: 
1. Who are the key stakeholders from the public health perspective in 
protecting the U.S. public from the intentional or unintentional 
introduction of microbial threats that originate abroad?   
2. What is the role of local public health in supporting the operations of the 
CDC Quarantine Stations? 
3. How can local, state and federal agencies with jurisdictional authority and 
responsibility collaboratively develop an infectious disease evaluation and 
response protocol to reduce the risk of an infectious disease of public 
health significance from entering the United States? 
4. How can public-private partnerships support this process? 
 
Who are the key stakeholders from the public health perspective in protecting the 
U.S. public from the intentional or unintentional introduction of microbial threats that 
originate abroad?  Based on the collaborative process, it is clear that effective disease 
detection and control is dependent upon a unified response by many local, state and 
federal entities, as well as private partnerships with industry.  The CDC Quarantine 
Station bears primary responsibility at the federal level, but it is unable to achieve its 
mission without a collaborative network of partner agencies and other community  
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stakeholders.  The challenge lies in the sustainability of this collaborative network and 
institutionalizing and formalizing the processes so that it does not depend on key 
individuals for success. 
What is the role of local public health in supporting the operations of the CDC 
Quarantine Stations?  This research has demonstrated the prime role of local public 
health in supporting the operations of the ATL QS.  The overlapping functions of local, 
state and federal public health, to perform biosecurity planning, information sharing, 
surveillance, assessment and response, unite local, state and federal entities in protecting 
the population from microbial threats.  Local public health provides the on-scene 
component for state and federal agencies in performing disease assessment, investigation 
and mitigation.  Local public health has a responsibility to maintain a collaborative 
network of partner agencies and other community stakeholders for open communication, 
cooperation and information sharing.  These relationships provide the portal through 
which the effectiveness of the ATL QS can be expanded at the local level.  
How can local, state and federal agencies with jurisdictional authority and 
responsibility collaboratively develop a rapid infectious disease evaluation and response 
protocol to reduce the risk of an infectious disease of public health significance from 
entering the United States?  The Collaborative Capacity Model described by Thomas et al 
provides a framework for analyzing success of such endeavors.  In this instance, all 
participating agencies were motivated, had a vested interest in the outcome, and benefited 
from improved processes and social network formation.  Participants were open, honest 
and respectful in discussing the various challenges and barriers.  The structure of the 
group included relevant stakeholders with sufficient authority to make and sustain policy 
decisions within their own agency and within the collaborative network.  The five 
components of the Collaborative Capacity Model including structure, people, lateral 
mechanisms, incentives and purpose and strategy were sufficient to describe these 
processes.  One component that may be lacking within the Collaborative Capacity Model 
is the element of leadership.  In the opinion of this author, leadership is critical as a 
driving force in successful collaborative initiatives.  The driving force in this project was 
provided by each of the members of the core work group at different times during the 
process, but primary responsibility for coordinating the meetings and developing the 
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documents was undertaken by the CHD.  Consistency and perseverance in driving the 
process forward was a critical factor in the success of this endeavor.  The democratic 
leadership style of the core work group members was a defining factor in obtaining buy-
in from multiple stakeholders across jurisdictions, but the initiative and sustainability was 
provided through the leadership of CHD.    
How can public-private partnerships support this process?  Government entities 
have traditionally relied on their own ability to screen travelers and prevent the entry of 
infectious diseases into the United States and have not engaged private industry in the 
process.  This research has demonstrated the willingness of shipping agents to participate 
in the disease reporting process and highlighted the lack of a clearly defined mechanism 
for them to do so.  The Savannah Maritime Association is a member of the Area 
Maritime Security Committee with a membership that encompasses port industry and 
local, state and federal governmental agencies with jurisdictional responsibility for the 
Georgia Ports.  The Savannah Maritime Association provides a common venue for all 
stakeholders.  Fear of disease and concerns regarding the onset of an influenza pandemic 
may provide a further impetus for cooperative participation this process.   
A “seeing is believing” strategy may improve the odds of participation in an 
educational forum.  The Port of Savannah has experienced several potential incidents that 
could have resulted in a public health emergency.  The threat of pandemic influenza and 
other emerging or reemerging infections could be utilized in the attempt to foster interest 
in a collaborative threat reduction plan.  These incidents could be utilized to lend 
credibility to the threat and underscore deficiencies in the current system.  Of course, the 
shipping agents have to be present in order to “see,” so introduction of the biothreat 
scenarios should be done during a group gathering, such as a Savannah Maritime 
Association meeting to elicit membership “buy-in.”  Educational information delivered 
by short briefings at monthly meetings may be an effective means to support ongoing 
training initiatives. 
Building collaborative capacity among agencies that bear jurisdictional 
responsibility in the prevention, detection, control and mitigation of the impact of a 
microbial threat upon the population is a critical homeland security initiative. 
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Implementation of these measures may provide a greater degree of biosecurity at the 
Georgia Ports (see Figure 14) as the output resulting from interagency participation, 
cooperation and improved surveillance.  The predictive factor for detection of infectious 
diseases is increased through better screening procedures and heightened surveillance.  A 
collaborative effort to establish an infectious disease response protocol may prevent or 
reduce the impact of an infectious disease threat through enhanced information sharing, 
communication and cooperation.  Essential partnerships have been established and a 
model for collaborative response to a biothreat at the Georgia Ports has been developed.   
 












































Figure 14.   Communicable Disease Detection and Control: Outputs Resulting from 
Interagency Participation, Cooperation and Surveillance 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 












































Figure 15.   Biological Threat Detection and Control: Ultimate Outcomes 
 
Recommendations are related to the outcomes of this project, a healthy 
community and healthy people, as shown in Figure 15, through the prevention or 
mitigation of an infectious disease threat by interagency network building and final 
response.  These recommendations include: 
1. Perform additional research to give more meaning to the shipping agent 
survey results and to validate them for a larger population, in order to 
generalize the findings. 
2. Establish regional approaches to infectious disease surveillance to include 
all seaports under the jurisdiction of the ATL QS. 
3. Determine the effectiveness of establishing a UC conference call through a 
full-scale exercise.   
4. Determine whether syndromic surveillance for EMS calls using seaport 
geo-clusters is an effective data source for increasing the detection rate 
and decreasing the response time for potential infectious diseases among 
nautical travelers. 
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5. Provide on-going educational briefings at the Savannah Maritime 
Association meetings to maintain awareness of disease reporting 
requirements and mechanisms. 
6. Develop methods to monitor the sustainability of the collaborative 
network, and institutionalize and formalize the processes so that it does 
not depend on key individuals for success. 
7. Determine the role that leadership attributes in interagency collaboration 
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APPENDIX A:  PARTICIPATING AGENCIES 
 
Atlanta Quarantine Station, Division of Quarantine and Global Migration, Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention 
Brunswick Emergency Medical Services 
Brunswick Police Department 
Chatham County Emergency Management Agency  
Coastal Health District 
Customs and Border Protection 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Georgia Division of Public Health 
Georgia Emergency Management Agency 
Georgia Public Health Laboratory  
Glynn County 911 Center  
Glynn County Emergency Management Agency 
Glynn County Emergency Medical Services 
MedStar Emergency Medical Services 
Memorial Health University Hospital 
Savannah Maritime Association 
Southeast Georgia Health System Brunswick Campus  
St Josephs/Candler Healthcare System  
Trident Health District, South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control  
United States Coast Guard Marine Safety Unit, Savannah 
United States Coast Guard, Sector Charleston 
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APPENDIX B:  CATEGORY A AND B DISEASES/AGENTS, 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 
CATEGORY A (DEFINITION BELOW) 
• Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis) 
• Botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxin)  
• Plague (Yersinia pestis)  
• Smallpox (variola major)  
• Tularemia (Francisella tularensis)  
• Viral hemorrhagic fevers (filoviruses [e.g., Ebola, Marburg] and 
arenaviruses [e.g., Lassa, Machupo]) 
CATEGORY B (DEFINITION BELOW) 
• Brucellosis (Brucella species)  
• Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens 
• Food safety threats (e.g., Salmonella species, Escherichia coli O157:H7, 
Shigella) 
• Glanders (Burkholderia mallei) 
• Melioidosis (Burkholderia pseudomallei) 
• Psittacosis (Chlamydia psittaci)  
• Q fever (Coxiella burnetii)  
• Ricin toxin from Ricinus communis (castor beans) 
• Staphylococcal enterotoxin B 
• Typhus fever (Rickettsia prowazekii) 
• Viral encephalitis (alphaviruses [e.g., Venezuelan equine encephalitis, 
eastern equine encephalitis, western equine encephalitis]) 
• Water safety threats (e.g., Vibrio cholerae, Cryptosporidium parvum) 
CATEGORY C (DEFINITION BELOW) 
• Emerging infectious diseases such as Nipah virus and hantavirus 
CATEGORY DEFINITIONS 
Category A Diseases/Agents 
The U.S. public health system and primary healthcare providers must be prepared to 
address various biological agents, including pathogens that are rarely seen in the 
United States. High-priority agents include organisms that pose a risk to national 
security because they  
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• can be easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person; 
• result in high mortality rates and have the potential for major public health 
impact; 
• might cause public panic and social disruption; and 
• require special action for public health preparedness. 
Category B Diseases/Agents 
Second highest priority agents include those that 
• are moderately easy to disseminate; 
• result in moderate morbidity rates and low mortality rates; and 
• require specific enhancements of CDC's diagnostic capacity and enhanced 
disease surveillance. 
Category C Diseases/Agents 
Third highest priority agents include emerging pathogens that could be engineered for 
mass dissemination in the future because of 
• availability; 
• ease of production and dissemination; and 
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